Evolutionary psychologists have long maintained that humans’ moral sense is essential to their success as a species and part of what makes humans unique among animals. Moral systems have functional roots, helping individual organisms survive, thrive, and pass on their genetic material. It is not despite anarchy but because of anarchy that humans have an ethical sense. Evolutionary theorists identify moral condemnation and binding morality as crucial for the emergence of other-regarding, altruistic behavior that makes liberal morality possible in the first place. When others harm us, or even third parties, we condemn, passing moral judgments and sometimes retaliating; we do not speak evil but speak of evil. Moral condemnation encouraged the development of moral conscience to avoid the outrage of, and often violent group punishment by, those who were wronged. This internalized sense of right and wrong in turn acted as a credible signal of cooperativeness that unwittingly and unconsciously paid material dividends. Group favoritism, also thought to have evolutionary origins, is moral in nature as well. Those early humans who felt obligated to contribute to the collective defense against common threats in an extremely dangerous environment could prosper enough to offset the competing incentives to free-ride within the group.

The focus on cosmopolitan humanitarianism obscures the totality of morality in international politics, leaving the empirical study of morality in IR with two central blindspots. First, it focuses on moral conscience – our desire to do good for others – to the neglect of moral condemnation, our response to the perceived unethical behavior of others, not only against third parties but also against ourselves. In both everyday life and IR, the response is generally to morally condemn, and often to punish and retaliate. Second, the IR ethics and morality literature have not come to terms with moral principles that operate at the group level, binding groups together. When “our” group is engaged in conflict with another, we owe the group our loyalty and defer to group authorities out of moral obligation. These “binding foundations” are particularly important for IR since foreign affairs are a matter of intergroup interaction. Together this means that groups, bound by moral commitment, do not compete with others in an amoral sphere in which ethics stops at the water’s edge. Once we cast our moral net more widely, we realize that morality is everywhere, more striking in the breach than the observance.

Globalization seemed like an irresistible, unstoppable force. Political plasticity seemed to be pushed to higher levels, as globalization accelerated and impacted all humankind. The development of larger units such as the European Union signaled, for many, the end of the nation state – a borderless world. Economic and technological forces seemed to be forcing globalization, and all humankind, down a one-way road. On closer examination, however, we realize that globalization has been taking place in a fractured manner: Just as economic and technological forces have been pushing us toward the global, basic identity needs have been pulling us back toward the local. Thus, just as Europe is integrating, there is Brexit and Basque and Scottish independence. Just as the North American Free Trade Agreement comes into place, there is Quebec nationalism and the effort by Quebec nationalists to break away from the rest of Canada. The deglobalization movement has been accelerated by the rise of authoritarian strongmen and their extremist nationalist supporters. As this chapter shows, it seems that basic identity needs and allegiances to local groups and nations have influenced developments, so that political plasticity remains limited in this domain.