We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter explores how the Germans judged the effectiveness of the ‘Jewish Councils’ in Western Europe throughout the course of the war. Throughout the occupation, the German (and Vichy) departments involved in Jewish affairs increasingly wanted to consolidate their control over the Jewish bodies, either to gain more power at the cost of their rival institutions or to speed up the process of anti-Jewish legislation and persecution. This is important for our understanding of the ways in which these organisations interacted with their German (or Vichy) overseers – including the SiPo-SD, the Commissariat Général aux Questions Juives (in France), the Military Administration (in Belgium and France) and the Civil Administration (in the Netherlands) – and sheds light on the broader dynamics of occupation in each of the three countries. The chapter demonstrates that whereas the Germans were reasonably satisfied with the organisational effectiveness of the Dutch Jewish Council, they took issue with how its Belgian and French counterparts functioned. It is argued that this difference is primarily caused by (limited) cooperation of individual leaders, the (lack of) leaders’ absolute power and the existence of powerful alternative representations in Belgium and France.
This chapter deals with the establishment histories of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud (the ‘Jewish Councils’ in Western Europe) in 1941. It shows that German officials improvised and copied blueprints from elsewhere, and that rivalry between the various German institutions involved in Jewish affairs affected the form and function of these organisations in Western Europe. It furthermore demonstrates that various German institutions interpreted the exact remit of each of the Jewish organisations differently. As a result, the Jewish organisations in Western Europe were all organised in different ways and all functioned differently, despite the strong German desire to unify anti-Jewish policies. The chapter furthermore examines the impact of the rivalry between the various German institutions on the Jewish organisations, arguing that the increasing influence of the SiPo-SD in the Netherlands, together with an overlap of functions, resulted in a rapid succession of anti-Jewish measures in this country. In Belgium and France, by contrast, institutional rivalry not only hampered the establishment of the AJB and the UGIF, but it also resulted in postponements and, from the German perspective, in a looser grip on the Jewish organisations.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.