International organisations include global organisations such as the United Nations and regional organisations such as the European Union. The chapter examines constituent instruments and their interpretation, membership (which may include non-state entities) and withdrawal, including the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. International organisations have the capacity to enter into treaties but may only conclude agreements in those areas in which they are competent to act. The Vienna Convention of 1986 adapts the rules of the 1969 Convention to apply to international organisations, but it is not yet in force. The chapter examines bodies which play a role in recommending or negotiating treaty texts (including the United Nations, UN Sixth Committee and the International Law Commission) and those which play a role in settling disputes (such as the International Court of Justice) and in monitoring compliance (such as the Human Rights Committee). It looks at special cases, including the OSCE, Commonwealth and European Union.

This chapter discusses the legal nature of the Security Council. It first defines the law applicable to the Council and then its nature as an organ of the UN, not a separate legal entity. It addresses and dismisses attemps to compare the Council to an executive, legislative or quasi-judicial body. Rather it is a UN organ with the primary resposibility for international peace and security, and that is what defines its legal nature. ThecChapter also addresses issues of the supremacy of legal obligations under the UN Charter over other sources of law, including binding decisions of the Council.

Human rights have traditionally been viewed as being of concern to governments only. The BHR discussion challenges this traditional, state-centric view and provides reasons why businesses ought to have human rights responsibilities, too. Such reasons or justifications can be formulated from an ethical, legal, and even a more pragmatic, managerial point of view. From an ethical perspective, the chapter shows why businesses have obligations beyond profit-maximization and why human rights obligations are among such responsibilities. It lays particular emphasis on the power and authority of corporations as a possible foundation. From a legal perspective, the chapter addresses the question of whether multinational corporations have international legal personality and assesses to what extent corporate human rights obligations can be derived from international human rights law. From a pragmatic perspective, the social license to operate and the so-called business case for human rights responsibilty are explored. The chapter concludes with some reflections on general objections against corporate human rights responsibility.

This chapter explains the basis of the access to justice obligations placed on international organisations (IOs) under international law. One foundational issue is whether or not IOs are capable of being placed under international obligations in general. The answer to this question, as this chapter will show, is most certainly in the affirmative. IOs are international legal persons or ‘subjects’ of international law that possess their own legal personality. This means that international law can bind IOs directly and impose obligations that ought to be implemented by the IO. After showing how international law can directly place IOs under international obligations in general, the focus shifts to whether IOs can be placed under access to justice obligations in particular. The chapter discusses what is meant by access to justice as a value, and how that value has translated into legal rights in the form of the right to a fair trial. The discussion then clarifies how IOs specifically are put under access to justice obligations, including demonstrating the rationale behind doing so. It is argued that IOs are required to provide justice consistently with fair trial guarantees to private persons whenever IO actions adversely impact them.

This chapter develops a detailed conceptual framework for micronations to better understand and interrogate their common features and considerable diversity. It does so by comparing and contrasting micronations to recognised sovereign states and other state-like entities. As we explain, a wide variety of entities with more or less effective government, more or less legitimate claims to statehood, and more or less recognition and acceptance by individual states and the international community, exist around the world. By developing a ‘statehood spectrum’ along which a range of state and state-like entities may be placed, these complexities can be unravelled and a clearer picture of what makes micronations distinct emerges. We find that micronations are self-declared nations that perform and mimic acts of sovereignty, and adopt many of the protocols of nations, but lack a foundation in domestic and international law for their existence and are not recognised as nations in domestic or international forums.

In our conclusion, we consider the future of micronationalism. We begin by outlining five major themes gleaned from our exploration of micronations. We examine the relationship between micronations and recognised states, the creativity needed to identify supposed fissures in international and domestic law to build a (doomed) case for independence, the diversity of this phenomenon, the transitory nature of micronations, and the gendered quality of micronationalism. Recognising the varied motivations that underpin the decision to establish one’s own country, we then consider in detail the value gained by claiming statehood. Finally, we conclude by asking whether micronations succeed or fail. Even though no micronation has ever become a recognised sovereign state, we argue that the future of micronationalism is anything but gloomy.

Chapter I discusses the relationship between international organisations and their member States and how both entities operate as international legal subjects. Looking underneath the veil of the legal personality of international organisations, it demonstrates that member States remain powerful actors in their own right, which has obvious implications for the application of international responsibility rules. With a focus on international financial institutions, the chapter begins by analysing the impact of State adhesion to international organisations, first from a domestic law perspective, and then from the viewpoint of international law, to highlight the notion that member States are continuously engaged in the exercise of the powers that they transferred to international organisations. Subsequently, and in order to clarify the borderline between both legal subjects, the chapter concentrates on the international legal personality of international organisations and how their legal distinctness comes about. It does so by exploring the concept of institutional autonomy. Against this backdrop, the chapter finalizes by shedding light into the elements that define member State conduct as subjects of international law. As the chapter concludes, such visibility is linked to the governance role of member States as ‘authority managers’ in international organisations.