This chapter offers an explication and partial defense of Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of international law.It begins with an overview of Dworkin’s objections to legal positivism and the account of law Dworkin offers in its place, commonly referred to as (legal) interpretivism.A reconstruction of Dworkin’s analysis of international law follows, which in addition to being of interest in its own right usefully illustrates Dworkin’s interpretivist account of law and his reasons for thinking it superior to the one defended by legal positivists.The chapter concludes with rebuttals to a series of objections that have been raised to Dworkin’s analysis of international law.The defense is only partial, however, since it presumes Dworkin’s interpretivist account of law.

This chapter describes the three purposes the book serves.The first is to introduce readers to certain core questions in the philosophy of law, by way of engagement with international legal skepticism.The book’s second aim is to acquaint readers with recent work by legal and political philosophers on conceptual and moral questions specific to particular domains of international law.These include the nature of human rights, and of a crime against humanity, as well as the moral justifiability of certain core features of the law of war, international trade law, and international law’s stance on unilateral secession.Finally, the book aims to advance the debate on many of the topics it discusses.Examples include novel readings of both H.L.A. Hart’s and Ronald Dworkin’s reflections on international law, as well as new arguments regarding the existence of an international rule of law, the possible bases of a moral duty to obey international law, and the moral grounds of universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.A brief chapter-by-chapter outline is also included.

This chapter investigates H.L.A. Hart’s characterization of law as the union of primary and secondary rules, and its implications for international law’s status as genuine law.While Hart is frequently identified as an international legal skeptic, that conclusion rests on a misreading of his analysis of international law or, in some cases, a misreading of his analysis of law.Hart does not deny that international law is law, only that it constitutes a legal system.Properly understood, this is a claim few of his critics will deny.

This chapter considers the extent to which the (so-called) international legal order provides an example of government in accordance with the rule of law.It begins in the first two sections with a discussion of the elements that comprise that ideal, before turning in the third section to competing accounts of its value; that is, explanations of what makes government in accordance with the rule of law (morally) superior to other forms of rule. The chapter concludes with a somewhat pessimistic assessment of the degree to which the international legal order exhibits fidelity to the ideal of the rule of law.

This chapter considers two arguments for international legal skepticism, both of which appeal to an alleged analytical connection between law and coercive enforcement.The first is the legal philosopher John Austin’s characterization of law as the command of a sovereign, or in H.L.A. Hart’s apt phrase, as orders backed by threats.The second treats the mode of enforcement found in the modern state as a necessary condition for the existence of law.If true, each of these conceptual claims provides a sound basis for international legal skepticism.There are compelling reasons to reject them both, however.