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This chapter evaluates the socially constructed meaning of the legal significance of resolutions at the adoption stage. It provides an empirical analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, of the relationship between the content of selected resolutions and the level of state support for those resolutions with a view to facilitating the discovery of emergent analytics – that is to say, key concepts shedding light on the scope, limits and intensity of the perceived binding character of resolutions at the adoption stage. The contention is that the text of resolutions cannot be taken at face value, hence it is not determinative of the legal significance of resolutions. It demonstrates that the concept of legal significance of resolutions at the adoption stage is determined by the characteristics of the General Assembly as a self-contained political system. It is therefore likely to differ from the concept of legal significance at the implementation stage.
This chapter examines the different functions that resolutions serve in state submissions before international courts and tribunals. The analysis revolves around two interrelated issues. On the one hand, it discerns between instances in which states treat resolutions as evidence of state practice and instances in which states treat resolutions as the practice of the General Assembly. On the other hand, the analysis evaluates the extent to which states and judges hold different views on the legal significance of resolutions. It demonstrates that issues relating to the legal significance of resolutions revolve around a double dichotomy generated by the different positions taken by states and judges in relation to assertion and attribution of the source of the legal significance of resolutions to state practice or the separate will of the General Assembly. It contends that it is difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about the legal significance of resolutions given the character of international polyarchy of the General Assembly. It then offers insights into the concept of autonomy of the General Assembly from its member states.
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