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As I show in this chapter, the broader developments in interpersonal and intersubjective relations that have taken place over the twentieth century have impacted on the way in which criminal responsibility organises relations of responsibility between individuals. I make two main arguments in this chapter. First, I argue that consorting laws fall into two generations. The first generation of laws, which appeared around the turn of the twentieth century, had a distinctive orientation, mode (which denotes the way in which criminal responsibility is expressed) and form. The second main argument made in this chapter is that these generations of consorting laws correspond to different relations of responsibility between individuals or ‘others’.