Argued April 10, 1967.Decided June 12, 1967.

Davis, J. delivered the opinion of the Court.*

Appellants challenge a statutory scheme adopted by the Commonwealth of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons whom the Commonwealth assigns to different racial classifications. We conclude that the scheme cannot stand, for it violates principles expressed in our founding documents and definitively embraced when the Nation was reconstructed by constitutional amendment after Confederate secession and Civil War. More specifically, such a statute fails to respect the dignity and autonomy of free people, and it violates our obligation of equal protection and respect for every member of our society.

Streeter’s chapter examines mixed-race life narratives that emerged in significant numbers in the mid-nineteen nineties and continues in the present time. Streeter contends these mixed-race narratives are a publishing trend begun after a distinct cultural turn in the nineteen-nineties, when the first generation of what she names post-Loving children, born just before and after interracial marriage became legal in 1967. The chapter focuses on black and white race mixture because, among the book-length life narratives investigating racially mixed ancestries and articulating mixed identities, most are authored from that perspective. Blackness and mixed-ness are, at the most fundamental level, overlapping discourses of identity in the United States. The fear of and fascination with race mixture between white people and Black people is a distinctly US American cultural trope. The color line – a tool of separation - and the one-drop rule – a deeply ambiguous barometer of Blackness – are contradictory imperatives. Under these circumstances, Streeter contends, dichotomy becomes the repetitive mode appending attempts to pin down intrinsic Blackness as articulated in mixed-race life writing.

Enslaved people sought freedom by any means possible. Most often they achieved free status through hard work, financial accumulation, negotiation, and legal confrontation. Building on slaves’ initiatives, Chapter Two looks at two legal areas in which Cuba diverged from Virginia and Louisiana: manumission and interracial marriage. Although seventeenth-century Virginians set no restrictions on the ability of a person of color to become free, or to marry a white person, that began to change toward the end of the century. By the early eighteenth century, manumission and interracial sex and marriage were restricted in both Virginia and Louisiana, unlike Cuba, where manumission never faced a serious legal challenge. Slaveholders and local authorities in Cuba resented the existence and social assertiveness of free blacks but were constrained by a deep-rooted legal order in which manumission was firmly entrenched and not tied to racial concerns. In Virginia and Louisiana, however, manumission became tied to the development of legal racial regimes that linked freedom to whiteness. In Cuba, black freedom became a contested but integral part of colonial society.