Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

4 results

The Behavioral Economics and Politics of Global Warming

The Behavioral Economics and Politics of Global Warming
  • Unsettling Behaviors
  • Hersh Shefrin
  • Published online:
    19 October 2023
    Print publication:
    16 November 2023
    • Element
      • You have access
      • Open access
    • PDF
    • HTML
    • Export citation
  • The main goal of this Element is to provide a psychological explanation for why actual global climate policy is so greatly at odds with the prescriptions of most neoclassical economists. To be sure, the behavioral approach does focus on why neoclassical models are often psychologically unrealistic. However, in this Element the author argues that the unrealistic elements are minor compared to the psychological pitfalls driving politically determined climate policy. Why this is the case is what the author describes as the 'big behavioral question.' More precisely, the big behavioral question asks about unsettling behaviors, why there is a huge gap between actual policy and even the weakest of the prescriptions in the range of plausible recommendations coming from neoclassical economists' integrated assessment models. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

  • Chapter 4 - What Oedipus Knew

  • Adam Lecznar, University College London
  • Book:
    Dionysus after Nietzsche
    Published online:
    27 March 2020
    Print publication:
    16 April 2020, pp 130-160

  • Summary

    Though the main figure of this chapter is the American theatre director and theorist Richard Schechner, it ranges widely in its attempt to understand the philosophical implications of the irrationalism that Nietzsche makes a central part of his vision of ancient Greece. Focusing on Dionysus and Oedipus in The Birth of Tragedy and beyond, it argues that the latter mythical hero represents the negative and harmful consequences of irrational, ecstatic knowledge and experience. After a detour through writings of Freud, Lévi-Strauss and Derrida on this subject, the chapter returns to Schechner and to his iconoclastic production Dionysus in 69. The version of Dionysus that emerged from this performative experience was connected to the contemporary discourse of the Dionysiac that expressed so many of the revolutionary and counter-cultural tendencies of the 1960s. In this way the chapter explores the way that Nietzsche’s Greeks underwrote some of the major symbolism of this significant cultural moment.

  • 7 - What Is the Problem?

  • from Part III - The Real Numbers (and the Complex Numbers)
  • T. W. Körner, University of Cambridge
  • Book:
    Where Do Numbers Come From?
    Published online:
    16 October 2019
    Print publication:
    24 October 2019, pp 137-166

  • Summary

    We show that the rationals will not support calculus. Using the intermediate value theorem, we discuss the properties required by a number system to allow us to do calculus. We state the fundamental axiom of analysis and obtain various equivalent forms of that axiom.

  • Mediational role of rumination and reflection on irrational beliefs and distress

  • Murat Artiran, Omer Faruk Şimşek, Martin Turner
  • Journal:
    Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy / Volume 47 / Issue 6 / November 2019
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    14 April 2019, pp. 659-671
    Print publication:
    November 2019
  • Background:

    The cognitive restructuring of maladaptive beliefs within many cognitive behavioural psychotherapies typically encourages the client to undertake self-reflection. However, whilst self-consciousness can aid self-regulation, it is also implicated in a broad Grange of psychopathologies. The extent to which self-consciousness is associated with psychological distress is yet to be fully determined, but recent literature suggests that irrational beliefs, as proposed within rational emotive behaviour theory (REBT) may play an important role.

    Aims:

    The aim of the study was to test the mediational effects of self-consciousness, specifically reflection and rumination, on the relationship between irrational beliefs and psychological distress. Based on past research, it was hypothesized that reflection and rumination would mediate the positive relationship between irrational beliefs and psychological distress. We expected irrational beliefs to interact with rumination to positively predict psychological distress, and irrational beliefs to interact with reflection to negatively predict psychological distress.

    Method:

    The present research tested a structural equation model (SEM) in which rumination and reflection mediated the relationship between irrational beliefs and psychological distress.

    Results:

    Results indicated that rumination mediates the positive relationship between irrational beliefs and psychological distress. However, in contrast to our hypotheses, significant mediation did not emerge for reflection.

    Conclusions:

    This study is the first to show how irrational beliefs and rumination interact to predict psychopathology using advanced statistical techniques. However, future research is needed to determine whether similar mediational effects are evident with rational beliefs as opposed to irrational beliefs.