This chapter examines Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s judicial interpretation, which has been formally legalized as a source of law for adjudication, as well as its relationship with various other statutes in China’s legislative system. It points out that the inner logic of China’s legislation with different hierarchical status, as distinct from those of democratically elected parliamentary systems, is determined by the de facto distribution of legislative power within its authoritarian regime, where the SPC has become a significant player in exercising legislative power in a way that has largely evolved beyond its constitutional settings. In particular, it investigates the unique inner logic of SPC’s judicial interpretations, which have become a de facto primary source of law for adjudication in practice.

In the UK, decisions taken on behalf of patients who lack capacity must be in their best interests, but the meaning of ‘best interests’ has evolved. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 codified the law relating to adults who lack capacity, offering a checklist of factors relevant to best interests assessment, including the person’s ‘past and present wishes and feelings’ and the ‘beliefs and values that would be likely to influence’ their decisions. Since 2013, the courts have gone further and, in some circumstances, seem to treat the patient’s wishes as the decisive factor. Now, a gap exists between what the statute says and its judicial interpretation. Doctors seeking guidance on how to weigh the patient’s own wishes when making a best interests decision will receive divergent advice from the legislation, guidance from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), and the law reports. This chapter suggests this discrepancy is unnecessarily confusing for health care professionals, patients and their families. If there is, or should be, a rebuttable presumption in favour of making the patient’s wishes decisive, the law would preferably state this clearly and unequivocally.

Tort law applies values-balancing reasoning to determine relational obligations; this chapter shows that the same reasoning applies to good faith obligations and contract interpretation.

As has been argued, Article 10(1) Berne mandates a quotation exception that we describe as global, mandatory fair use. It is global because of the reach of Berne and TRIPS. It creates a mandatory exception because of the clear language of the provision and its travaux. It relates to ‘use’ that is not limited by type of work, type of act, or purpose and which ‘quotation’ should be understood broadly. Finally, it is ‘fair’ use because the conditions of Article 10 – namely, the work having been lawfully made available to the public, attribution, proportionality, and fair practice must be satisfied. In particular, the requirement of ‘fair practice’ embraces a range of normative considerations relating to economic and moral harm, distributive justice, freedom of expression and, in limited situations, custom.