Following a two-decade long conversation, the Criminal Justice Act of 1991 introduced a system of income-related fines in England and Wales, known as ‘unit fines’. This system turned out to be remarkably short-lived. The practical difficulties that surrounded its operation, alongside intense criticism from parts of the media, led not its reform, but instead to its abrupt abolition a few months later. This Chapter begins by discussing the policy rationales that underpinned the adoption of ‘unit fines’ in England and Wales, before taking a closer look into the statutory framework. Then, it explores the reasons why this fining system failed to take roots in England and Wales, by looking at the challenges that followed its implementation. These challenges, coupled with the magistrates’ perception that this system was too rigid, and the growing discontent from parts of the press, led to its rapid demise. Since then, policymakers have considered the possibility of re-introducing income-related fines a number of times, but the idea was never embraced. Unit fines have instead been replaced by a system that sits in the middle of the spectrum between fixed and day fines.

This chapter considers the practical implications of free will skepticism and discusses recent empirical work that has just begun to investigate the matter. It argues that there are good philosophical and empirical reasons for thinking that belief in free will, rather than providing the pragmatic benefits many claim, actually has a dark side; i.e., it is too often used to justify punitive excess in criminal justice, to encourage treating people in severe and demeaning ways, and to excuse and perpetuate social and economic inequalities. After addressing recent empirical findings in social psychology that purport to show that diminishing one’s belief in free will increases antisocial behavior – findings that are overblown and questionable – the chapter discusses contrary findings in moral and political psychology that reveal interesting and troubling correlations between people’s free will beliefs and their other moral, religious, and political beliefs. It concludes that we would be better off without the notions of free will and just deserts.

Recent free will denialism (FWD) tends to be optimistic, claiming that not only will the rejection of the belief in free will and moral responsibility not make matters dreadful but that we are indeed better off without them. I address the denialist claim that FWD has the philosophical resources to effectively safeguard human rights and respect for persons in the context of punishment, even without belief in free will, moral responsibility, and desert. I raise seven reasons for doubt concerning the ability of FWD to maintain deontological constraints. Together they present a strong case for doubting the optimism of FWD.