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The fourth chapter gives a succinct historical description of the secular nationalist ideologies in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel and compares the secular political movements in these countries as they have different regime types and political cultures. The chapter also provides brief biographical accounts of the three top executive leaders from each country: Bashar al-Assad, Saad al-Hariri, and Benjamin Netanyahu. The authors also present and compare the operational code results of the leaders and deliberate on what kind of generic foreign policy behavior and strategies we should expect from secular nationalist leaders. The chapter also sheds light on what these results and strategies mean for MENA politics and for the international relations discipline.
Chapter five focuses on the leadership of armed nonstate actors in the MENA, with an emphasis on the foreign policy conceptualizations of leaders. The chapter starts by accounting for the genesis of ANSAs in the region, and their emergence and increasing significance for MENA politics is stressed. The authors also give the psycho-biographies of the top executive leaders of ANSAs: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS, Abdullah Öcalan of PKK, Salih Muslim of PYD, and Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah. Lastly, the chapter discusses the operational code results of the studied ANSA leaders and elaborates on their implications for MENA and world politics. The discussion focuses on what kind of leadership ANSAs produce and what it means for states that are trying to contain or negotiate with them. The chapter also addresses the question of what these results mean in terms of FPA’s actor-specific approach as opposed to IR theories’ actor-general explanations of world politics
In the third chapter, the authors discuss the origins and evolution of the Shia political Islam with a focus on the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Ayatollahs’ revolutionary vision which aimed to export the Iranian political-religious model to other countries. This chapter gives an overview of the psycho-biographies of influential Shia leaders: Ali Khamenei, Hassan Rouhani, Ali al-Sistani, and Nouri al-Maliki. The authors discuss the operational code analysis results and deliberate on what kind of generic foreign policy behavior and strategies we should expect from Shia political Islamist leaders. The chapter also sheds light on what these results and strategies mean for the MENA politics and consider the implications of this analysis for Iran’s relations with the United States, the EU, and regional powers; Iraq’s foreign relations; and the future of Iraq as a viable power in regional politics. The authors conclude by discussing what these results mean for foreign policy decision-making and the international relations discipline.
The second chapter provides a brief description of the Sunni political Islam as an ideology with a focus on its historical provenances of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its diffusion to the broader MENA region. This chapter gives an overview of the psycho-biographies of individual Muslim Brotherhood leaders: Mohamed Morsi, Rashid Ghannouchi, and Khaled Mashal. The authors discuss the operational code analysis results and deliberate on what kind of generic foreign policy behavior and strategies we should expect from the Sunni political Islamist leaders. The chapter also sheds light on what these results and strategies mean for MENA politics. The chapter concludes that despite the conventional portrayal of Muslim Brotherhood leadership, these leaders resort to negotiation and cooperation to settle their differences, hence the best way to approach them is to engage in a Rousseauvian assurance game that emphasizes international social cooperation.
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