We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter makes a general argument, equally applicable (mutatis mutandis) to the IOM as to the World Bank, or the World Health Organization or even the European University Institute. While it is arguable that the IOM has no strong humanitarian mission, this circumstance alone is unlikely to affect its legal accountability – the problems with accountability of international organizations under international law go much, much deeper. Legal accountability (not quite a term of art perhaps) is conceptualized as utilizing a (more or less) legal mechanism to test the acts of an international organizations against (more or less) legal standards. This may be done before a court, but may also involve internal accountability mechanisms. Those standards, in turn, do not simply comprise the entire corpus of international law, but are limited, it is generally agreed, to the treaties that international organizations are parties to, to international legal rules that have become internalized, and to the ‘general rules of international law’. There is consensus that this is an authoritative enumeration, but precious little agreement on what this entails
[38.1] Statutory reasonableness refers to the use in legislation of the ‘reasonableness’ standard in its various forms. The concept of statutory reasonableness may be profitably examined, taking in its general characteristics and its special interpretative aspects. The importance of examining it is underlined by the fact that, for a number of compelling reasons, it is widely used in statute law.
The common law consists of legal rules, principles, and standards. Common law legal rules are relatively specific legal norms that require actors to act or not act in a specified way, enable or disable specified types of arrangement, or set remedies for specific wrongs. In contrast, legal principles are relatively general legal norms. Because of their generality, legal principles can generate, explain, and justify legal rules, while, because of their specificity, legal rules normally cannot generate, explain, or justify either legal principles or other legal rules. And because of their specificity, most legal rules can determine cases with little or no elaboration. In contrast, most legal principles must be elaborated to determine cases. As used in the common law, the term standard has three different meanings: it may be used as a collective noun that includes all legal norms; it may be used to mean extremely general legal norms; or it may refer to legal rules that are not applicable at the time they are adopted because they are designed to be further elaborated, usually by administrative agencies.
The common law, which is made by courts, consists of rules that govern relations between individuals, such as torts (the law of private wrongs) and contracts. Legal Reasoning explains and analyzes the modes of reasoning utilized by the courts in making and applying common law rules. These modes include reasoning from binding precedents (prior cases that are binding on the deciding court); reasoning from authoritative although not binding sources, such as leading treatises; reasoning from analogy; reasoning from propositions of morality, policy, and experience; making exceptions; drawing distinctions; and overruling. The book further examines and explains the roles of logic, deduction, and good judgment in legal reasoning. With accessible prose and full descriptions of illustrative cases, this book is a valuable resource for anyone who wishes to get a hands-on grasp of legal reasoning.
Due diligence obligations are typically described by scholars and practitioners as 'elusive', 'weak', and difficult to pin down in the abstract. Challenging these assumptions, this book offers a systematic reconstruction of the foundations of due diligence obligations of states and explores their nature, rationale, content and scope of operation in international law. Tackling due diligence from a general perspective, this book seeks to complement scholarly studies on public international law obligations and their theory. This book will be relevant for academics, practitioners, graduate students across international law and anyone seeking to better conceptualise due diligence under international law and understand how due diligence obligations are operationalised in practice.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.