Human dignity is a contested concept. While “dignity as autonomy” reflects universalist liberal egalitarianism, “dignity as status”refers to an aspect of social relationship within a hierarchically ordered society. While all citizens have inherent dignity, individuals occupying certain offices or attaining certain accomplishments may enjoy special dignity, in the form of privileges and immunities. This is evident in Singapore, where the government promotes relational constitutionalism, which seeks to secure rights while sustaining durable relationships and solidarity within an ethnically and religiously diverse polity. While dignity is not an explicit constitutional value, this chapter explores how it is apprehended as a public value. The government has endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms human dignity as foundational. It considers how human dignity has been invoked before and beyond the courts, examining how the concept and cognates like honor, integrity, benevolence and virtue shape each other. Particular attention is paid to how human dignity is shaped as manifest in laws regulating political defamation and the treatment of migrant workers.

Police practices substantiate legal abstractions, but frequently the police are influenced by normative frameworks beyond the framework of the civil laws that regulate their work.This chapter examines the interrelationship between Jordan’s tradition of legal pluralism and the hegemonic values that influence different kinds of social order. It also considers how the civil legal system takes account of tribal settlements with respect to the ‘personal right’ accorded to victims, and reviews how the blend of customary, formalised tribal, Islamic and civil legal traditions that co-exist in Jordan shape the field of practice within which the police manage grievances. Frequently exercising discretion, the police treat some of these grievances as crimes, and others as disputes between citizens, reflecting the common reticence of citizens to prosecute cases in the civil courts.

This chapter introduces the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. It outlines the various components of his liberal individualistic theory and how this conceptualises group phenomena including religion. It notes how English law is largely based on this model, highlights its deficiencies as regards the regulation of religion, and traces its declining influence from 2016. It argues that liberal individualism is a suboptimal model on which to base the law of religion because it takes insufficient account of groups and civil society.