A recent FAWC report introduced ‘a life worth living’ as a useful concept in farm animal welfare discussions and policy. But what does this concept mean? And is it a useful one? This paper extends FAWC's approach in several ways. It firstly provides an account of the concept of a life worth living in more detail, in relation to current animal welfare thinking, such as experiences and quality of life. It then describes how the concept might be applied in animal welfare management decisions and in setting standards for regulations and Farm Assurance schemes. The paper identifies several advantages to the concept: it is animal-based, intuitively understandable, and has direct prescriptive force in decision-making. But the concept also has certain limitations, especially that it is potentially complex and subjective and that it cannot include all ethically relevant concerns about farm animal welfare. Nevertheless, the paper concludes that the concept may become a useful addition to welfare dialogue, and finishes by identifying the core areas where further work is necessary.

The Procreation Asymmetry holds that we have strong moral reasons not to create miserable people for their own sakes, but no moral reasons to create happy people for their own sakes. To defend this conjunction against an argument that it leads to inconsistency, I show how recognizing ‘creation’ as a temporally extended process allows us to revise the conjuncts in a way that preserves their intuitive force. This defense of the Procreation Asymmetry is preferable to others because it does not require us to take on controversial metaphysical or metaethical commitments – in other words, it has the theoretical virtue of portability.