Relying on fieldwork conducted in two provinces, this article provides a systemic study of China's Government Work Reports (GWRs), examining their function, format, how they are formulated and implemented, their content and their research values. Whilst the existing literature mostly focuses on central government reports, this research integrates GWRs from all administrative levels. I argue that over time, the GWRs have developed into a highly institutionalized nationwide system with two important aspects – local elites’ autonomy in setting work agendas, and their compliance with central government policy priorities. Additionally, my study shows that by using quantifiable targets and celebrating achievements framed in concrete statistics, the GWRs help to sustain the legitimacy of the party-state. Finally, my study finds GWRs to be a versatile scholarly resource that can be used for various research interests and methods.

This paper proposes a new institutional perspective to explain not only the diversity of local business systems in China but also how this diversity results from the integration of major institutional forces. We model the emergence of China's business systems as a co-evolutionary process unfolding along a business–government and a micro–macro-level dimension structured by intergovernmental institutional competition, business to business and business to government networking and public-private corporate governance. We find that: (i) China's emerging business system is the result of local institutional competition at the micro level that reduces the need for national (macro) institutions and impacts on the local implementation of national (including supranational) policies; (ii) the interaction between government and business is structured through networks which operate according to an economic rationale while drawing on cultural norms and traditions; and (iii) local businesses interact with local governments to recombine productive factors and reorganise firms and industries in line with local institutions. We conclude that the astonishing adaptability of Chinese businesses as well as the risk of corruption and lack of formal control at local government level are elements of locally differentiated business systems which are held together by an overarching institutional architecture.