Over the past two generations a fundamental change has taken place in the scholarly understanding of the commercial world of late imperial China. Lasting from the Song (960–1279) to the end of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), this millennium of Chinese history had long been judged a period of decline, its initial economic breakthroughs never fulfilling their promise. The commercial and technological innovations of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were thought to have given way to economic stagnation and cultural conservatism, as the enterprising peasantry and merchants of south China lost out to the prerogatives of Confucian scholar-officials and their state-sponsored culture in the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties. Tested by a highly competitive examination regime and thereafter sheltered by a host of privileges, these scholar-officials acquired and retained an unrivalled hegemony that was cultural, political, and, some would add, economic. When China suffered a severe economic downturn during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the once-admired stability of the Qing regime was criticized for its backwardness, and the late imperial economy of these scholar-officials’ rule was condemned for its stagnation.

The contrast, then, of the success of this group of merchants with a political dynasty in decline and with many educated men feeling that their learning and values were threatened by the ascendance of these merchants and a great number of other late Ming changes provides a suitable beginning to a book concerned in part with the trouble Huizhou merchants had in gaining public, official, and social recognition of their changed place in the Chinese economy by the end of the Ming.

Chapter 3 will examine Huizhou merchants’ efforts to penetrate major market sites in the Yangzi Valley and along the Grand Canal. It will introduce the problems they encountered, such as brigandry when traveling and local protectionism when marketing, and then consider various merchant countermeasures. Ranging from secret security arrangements and bribery to new financial instruments and hired protection or clientage, these merchant responses appear not to have involved any serious effort to forge public or political institutions that would protect merchant interests. Quite likely, the diversity of Huizhou merchant interests obstructed any collective effort leading to one policy or solution. While its shippers may have desired government protection, Huizhou pawnbrokers strove to thwart all government intrusion (the first tax specifically on pawnbrokering dates from 1623). As their credit operations became increasingly enmeshed in commercial deals, pawnbrokers’ profits and secrecy aroused greater criticism, as did the activities of Huizhou merchants in general in the later half of the Ming.