Home equity release products have been promoted as a potential solution to residential long-term care costs for the elderly. Lower than expected utilisation of home equity release loans has prompted efforts to better model and price the no-negative-equity-guarantee (NNEG) built into the contracts, but loan rates are still widely perceived by homeowners as being unattractive. We propose the introduction of a new adjustable rate loan based on a regional house price index, with the NNEG being borne by a specially created intermediary. The proposed approach allows us to directly address and separately price the basis risk between individual house price returns and index returns. In addition, it offers the opportunity to create securities based on residential real estate that would be attractive to a wider class of investors. The alternative risk-sharing mechanism creates a more transparent and simple pricing structure for the loans. We then use house sales data to demonstrate the approach. We find in our sample that it would be possible to make higher loans than seen in previous literature using standard roll-up contracts. In the most favourable scenario for our simulations, the maximum loan is 89% of the appraised home value if the loan is advanced as a lump sum and 95% if the loan is advanced in instalments.

This paper assesses the feasibility and welfare-improving potential of an insurance market for aged care expenses in Australia. As in many other countries, demographic dynamics coupled with an upward trend in costs of personal care result in consumer co-contributions imposing a risk of expenses that could constitute a significant proportion of lifetime savings, in spite of the presence of a government-run aged care scheme. We explore issues around the development of an insurance market in this particular setting, considering adverse selection, moral hazard, timing of purchase, transaction costs and correlation of risks, as well as such contextual factors as longevity and aged care cost determinants. The analysis indicates aged care insurance is both feasible and welfare-enhancing, thus providing a gainful alternative to the aged care reform proposed by the Productivity Commission in 2011. However, while the insurance market would benefit the ageing Australian population, it is unlikely to emerge spontaneously because of the problem of myopic individual perceptions of long-term goals. Consequently, we recommend regulatory action to trigger the market development.