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A mass-casualty incident (MCI) can occur in the periphery of a densely populated area, away from a metropolitan area. In such circumstances, the medical management of the casualties is expected to be difficult because the nearest hospital and the emergency medical services (EMS), only can offer limited resources.When coping with these types of events (i.e., limited medical capability in the nearby medical facilities), a quick response time and rational triage can have a great impact on the outcome of the victims. The objective of this study was to identify the lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist attack that occurred on 05 December 2005, in Netanya, a small Israeli city.
Methods:
Data were collected during and after the event from formal debriefings and from patient files. The data were processed using descriptive statistics and compared to those from previous events. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology.
Results:
Four victims and the terrorist died as a result of this suicide bombing. A total of 131 patients were evacuated (by EMS or self-evacuation) to three nearby hospitals. Due to the proximity of the event to the ambulance dispatch station, the EMS response was quick.The first evacuation took place only three minutes after the explosion. Non-urgent patients were diverted to two close-circle hospitals, allowing the nearest hospital to treat urgent patients and to receive the majority of self-evacuated patients. The nearest hospital continued to receive patients for >6 hours after the explosion, 57 of them (78%) were self-evacuated.
Conclusion:
The distribution of casualties from the scene plays a vital role in the management of a MCI that occurs in the outskirts of a densely populated area.Non-urgent patients should be referred to a hospital close to the scene of the event, but not the closest hospital.The nearest hospital should be prepared to treat urgent casualties, as well as a large number of self-evacuated patients.
Mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) are on the rise. The ability to locate, identify, and triage patients quickly and efficiently results in better patient outcomes. Poor lighting due to time of day, inclement weather, and power outages can make locating patients difficult. Efficient methods of locating patients allow for quicker transport to definitive care.
Objective:
The objective of this study was to evaluate the methods currently used in mass-casualty collection, and to determine whether the use of the Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) triage tag system can be improved by using easily discernable tags (glow sticks) in conjunction with the standard triage tags.
Methods:
Numerous drills were performed utilizing the START triage method. In Trial A, patients were identified with the triage tags only. In Trial B, patients were identified using triage tags and glow sticks. Four rounds of triage drills were performed in low ambient light for each Trial, and the differences in casualty collection times were compared.
Results:
Casualty relocation and collection times were considerably shorter in the trials that utilized both the glow sticks and triage tags. An average of 2.58 minutes (31.75%) were saved during the casualty collections. In addition, fewer patient errors occurred during the trials in which the glow sticks were used. Between the four rounds, an average of four patient errors occurred during the trials that utilized the triage tags. However, there was an average of only one patient error for the drills when participants utilized both the triage tags and the glow sticks.
Conclusions:
The use of the highly visible glow sticks, in conjunction with the START triage tags, allowed for more rapid and accurate casualty collection in suboptimal lighting. The use of the glow sticks made it easier to relocate previously triaged patients and arrange for expeditious transport to definitive care. In addition, the glow sticks reduced the number of patient errors. Most importantly, there was a significant reduction in the number of patients that initially were triaged via the START method, but were overlooked during casualty collection and transport.
Proper management of mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) relies on triage as a critical component of the disaster plan.
Objective:
The objective of this study was to assess the precision of triage in mass-casualty incidents.
Methods:
The precision of decisions made by two experienced triage officers was examined in two large MCIs. These decisions were compared to the real severity of injury as defined by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) classification of severity of injuries and the Injury Severity Score (ISS).
Results:
Two experienced trauma physicians triaged a total of 94 casualties into 77 mild, seven moderate, and 10 severe casualties. Based on the IDF criteria, there were 74 mild, five moderate, and 15 severe casualties. Based on ISS scoring, there were 78 mild (ISS <9), five moderate (9 ≤ISS<16), and 11 severe (ISS < 16) casualties. Of 15 severely injured victims defined by the IDF classification of injury severity, the triage officers identified only seven (47%).
Conclusion:
Primary triage, even when carried out by experienced trauma physicians, can be unreliable in a MCI.
Large-scale, terrorist attacks can happen in peripheral areas, which are located close to a country's borders and far from its main medical facilities and involve multi-national casualties and responders. The objective of this study was to analyze the terrorist suicide bombings that occurred on 07 October 2004, near the Israeli-Egyptian border, as representative of such a complex scenario.
Methods:
Data from formal debriefings after the event were processed in order to learn about victim outcomes, resource utilization, critical events, and time course of the emergency response.
Results:
A total of 185 injured survivors were repatriated: four were severely wounded, 13 were moderately injured, and 168 were mildly injured. Thirty-eight people died. A forward medical team landed at the border town's airport, which provided reinforcement in the field and in the local hospital. Israeli and Egyptian search and rescue teams collaborated at the destruction site. One-hundred sixty-eight injured patients arrived at the small border hospital that rapidly organized itself for the mass-casualty incident, operating as an evacuation “staging hospital”. Twenty-three casualties secondarily were distributed to two major trauma centers in the south and the center of Israel, respectively, either by ambulance or by helicopter.
Conclusion:
Large-scale, terrorist attacks at a peripheral border zone can be handled by international collaboration, reinforcement of medical teams at the site itself and at the peripheral neighboring hospital, rapid rearrangement of an “evacuation hospital”, and efficient transport to trauma centers by ambulances, helicopters, and other aircraft.