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2 results

  • Chapter 7 - Wittgenstein and the covert Platonism of mathematical logic

  • from Part I - The Main Positions
  • Edited by Penelope Rush, University of Tasmania
  • Book:
    The Metaphysics of Logic
    Published online:
    05 October 2014
    Print publication:
    16 October 2014, pp 128-144

  • Summary

    This chapter discusses a kind of relativism or pluralism concerning logic. It explores a core metaphysical issue concerning logic, the extent to which logic is objective. The chapter adopts a Hilbertian perspective, either the original version where consistency is the only formal, mathematical requirement on legitimate theories, or the liberal orientation where there are no formal requirements on legitimacy at all. It explores the ramifications for what the author takes to be a longstanding intuition that logic is objective. This chapter explains the matter of objectivity with the present folk-relativism concerning logic in focus. Sometimes it concentrates on general logical matters, such as validity and consistency, as such, and sometimes it deals with particular instances of the folk-relativism, such as classical validity, intuitionistic consistency, and the like. The chapter limits the discussion to Wright's axes of epistemic constraint and cognitive command.

  • Chapter 5 - Waiting for the self

  • Edited by JeeLoo Liu, California State University, Fullerton, John Perry, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    Consciousness and the Self
    Published online:
    05 December 2011
    Print publication:
    17 November 2011, pp 123-149

  • Summary

    Hume offers his introspective report in a discussion of personal identity, which is traditionally regarded as a metaphysical issue. This chapter focuses on the phenomenal thesis that Hume advances in the course of addressing the metaphysical question of what it is to be a self and how a single self can endure changes over time. Philosophical thinking about self-consciousness got a major boost when Descartes formulated his cogito. In saying "I think" in the first person, and declaring that this is indubitable, Descartes implies that there is an I, which is directly accessed in consciousness. Descartes' account is a paradigm case of a non-reductive theory of the phenomenal self because it implies that the self is present in experience but not reducible to anything else. Body ownership has been intensively studied in cognitive neuroscience. The notion of ownership has been contrasted in cognitive neuroscience with the notion of authorship.