The terminology of an ‘economic constitution’ is little used in the UK, and coverage of the constitutional aspects of economic management finds only limited (and diminishing) space in the standard constitutional law texts. This is in marked contrast to other European jurisdictions, where the economic constitution is a familiar analytical concept for both domestic and EU law.

In the UK Constitution, Parliament provides the primary public forum in which the government is held to account on behalf of the electorate. The idea that the government and its ministers are, collectively and individually, responsible to Parliament for their policies, actions and inactions is perhaps the core principle on which accountability within the framework of the political constitution is based. This chapter opens by briefly contrasting the mechanisms of political and legal accountability within the constitution, before going on to examine the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, considering its requirements, operation and effectiveness.

This chapter examines the cases situated in the UK political system. Blame games in the UK political system do not often produce much more than hot air. The reason for this surprising outcome are institutional factors that render it difficult for opponents to reach their reputational and policy goals. Ministers, who are usually only briefly in office and are not personally responsible for a controversy, constitute very strong blame shields for the government of the day since, in the absence of personal wrongdoings, they cannot be brought to resign. The ‘administration bias’, injected by forms of agencification and reinforced by the work of parliamentary committees, ensures that the ministerial blame shield is often not even checked for its resilience during a blame game because media attention and opponent attacks overwhelmingly focus on administrative actors and entities. Incumbents can thus remain rather passive during a blame game, tolerate occasional criticism from the governing majority, and develop strong incentives to leave a policy controversy unaddressed.