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The last chapter that focuses on individual decisions, discusses activism in rallies and protests as a national conversation over Russia’s future. The first section of the chapter demonstrates that the protest actions in Moscow framed this conversation and provided a focal point for increased participation. The findings support information cascade theories of mobilization in the protest movement but not in the rallies, where increased participation continued to rely on regime incentives. The second section of the chapter focuses on the competing frames that the opposition and regime developed to characterize the national conversation. Relying on the data, the final section focuses on frame resonance, exploring the effectiveness of state and opposition framing in shaping protesters attitudes.
Chapter 4 focuses on the Russian case, showing that even weakly organized oppositions can influence electoral outcomes. The chapter demonstrates how central concepts in social movement theory, social movement organizations, opportunity structure, and mobilizing frames also influence the information environment in which elections are held. The narrative illustrates that between 2008 and 2011, the Russian opposition altered popular perception by creating a coalition across different types of protest groups. It also underscores that the opposition’s unwillingness and inability to work with labor organizations limited the reach of the nascent movement and precluded cross-class coalition that is central to regime breakthrough. Nonetheless, these changes generated new information about the structure and reach of opposition as the 2011 election approached. The regime response included organizing new, state-sponsored organization, the articulation of competing frames, and the judicious use of repression. While these efforts shored up core regime support they failed to stifle opposition signals and may have demonstrated growing fears as the next election cycle approached.
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