Psychologists and others have long debated the moral consequences of religious identification, religious belief, spirituality, and religious ritual adherence. Many enlightened luminaries have been disquieted by fears of how people might act in a world without the strictures of God and religion. This chapter reviews data on how people around the world see morality and its linkage to religion. The chapter also considers theory and research on why people might want to act morally in the first place. One problem concerns defining just what people mean by moral character, a question explored from various angles. Moral psychology has developed as an important field, but one that frequently treats religious variables as an afterthought. Still, moral psychology is essential to understanding the development of values inside and outside religion and a large section of this chapter reviews relevant research and theory. The chapter also examines empirical studies of the connection between various measures of religiousness and generosity, charity, honesty, lawfulness, sexual propriety, sobriety, racial tolerance, open-mindedness, and other aspects of prosocial behavior.

This chapter features a book from the era which marks the culmination of the Ottoman intellectual efforts to reinstate traditional categories of knowledge from an imperial perspective. Ahlak-i Alai [The morals of Ali] of Kınalızade Ali Çelebi showcases the maturation of moral thinking that overlaps the central themes of Shakespearean virtue ethics. Written by a contemporary of Shakespeare and became the representative account of moral thinking in social and political domains of the Ottomans, the book is of interest to the readers of Shakespeare as it accommodates more parallels with the moral world of Englishmen than indicated in Shakespeare’s ‘turning Turk’ in Othello. Ahlak-i Alai follows in form and content the Aristotelian virtue ethics and deals with a broad spectrum of questions from the source of morality and the possibility of an individual’s moral education to the highest good and the moral order in society. It is suggested in the chapter that the common moral ground of Ottomans and Shakespeare is shaped mainly by the Aristotelian virtue ethics whose objective is to operate in moderation what is thought to be the powers of the self.

Chapter 8 reconstructs Kierkegaard’s ignored critique of consequentialism, a critique that is still relevant to ethics. It is argued that morality and religion require not only good intentions but also a good character. However, since moral character itself is not directly accessible, but only shown indirectly by words and deeds, Kierkegaard describes it in terms of hidden inwardness, which is only seen by God. Still, such inwardness neither entails a hidden, private domain nor “negative outwardness,” which “confines itself (in order not to be seen for what it is)” (Jack Mulder). Nor does it entail enclosing reserve (Indesluttethed), which is inwardness in deadlock. Instead, it represents an inwardness that strives to express itself in words and deeds. As a result, Kierkegaard’s moral psychology is more defensible and less problematic than often assumed.