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3 results

  • 13 - Critical Theory, Local Moral Perception, and Democratic Education

  • from Part Two - Philosophical and Normative Foundations
  • Edited by Julian Culp, The American University of Paris, France, Johannes Drerup, Universität Dortmund, Douglas Yacek, Universität Dortmund
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Democratic Education
    Published online:
    20 April 2023
    Print publication:
    27 April 2023, pp 196-229

  • Summary

    This chapter attempts to answer two questions. First, what does democratic education informed by critical theory minimally entail? Second, what does it take for a critical democratic education to succeed? The chapter argues that attention to local contexts is a necessary aspect for developing critical and democratic virtues. The chapter first sets the stage by offering a sketch of both democratic education and critical theory. The following section draws out a common occluding characteristic of both democratic education and critical education, namely, their preoccupation with national and global scopes. The next two sections draw on the work of Iris Murdoch and John McDowell to argue that cultivating moral attention to one’s local setting must be seen as an essential aspect of critical democratic education. The chapter concludes by offering brief educational applications and responses to objections related to objectivity and the threat of parochialism.

  • Reid on the moral sense

  • Rebecca Copenhaver
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 41 / Issue S1 / July 2011
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2020, pp. 80-101

  • Some interpret Reid's notion of a moral sense as merely analogical. Others understand it as a species of acquired perception. To understand Reid's account of the moral sense, we must draw from his theory of perception and his theory of aesthetic experience, each of which illuminate the nature and operation of the moral faculty. I argue that, on Reid's view, the moral faculty is neither affective nor rational, but representational. It is a discrete, basic, capacity for representing the real moral properties of humans and human conduct.

  • Chapter 9 - Can normativity be naturalized?

  • Edited by Susana Nuccetelli, St Cloud State University, Minnesota, Gary Seay
  • Book:
    Ethical Naturalism
    Published online:
    05 January 2012
    Print publication:
    08 December 2011, pp 169-193

  • Summary

    This chapter explores the possibility of naturalizing the normative. It shows how some of the aims of well-conceived naturalization projects can be achieved: normative properties are in some cases accessible to perception and, even apart from that possibility, may be justifiedly ascribed to actions or other elements on the basis of clearly natural properties. One reason for the philosophical attraction of naturalizing normativity is what one might call the epistemological authority of perception. For philosophical naturalists, perception is often taken to have epistemological sovereignty, in the sense that it is essential for any other kind of knowledge and is the ultimate test of claims to knowledge or justified belief. Naturalization projects occur in all major domains of inquiry: for instance, in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, even theology. Any account of ethical objectivity, something ethical naturalists wish to preserve, should provide a major role for perception.