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2 results

  • 3 - Must we turn the trolley?

  • Edited by Hallvard Lillehammer, Birkbeck, University of London
  • Book:
    The Trolley Problem
    Published online:
    24 February 2023
    Print publication:
    02 March 2023, pp 42-58

  • Summary

    Helen Frowe argues against a common view of the standard Trolley Scenario according to which it is permissible but not required to kill the one as a side effect of saving the five. She argues that saving the five and killing the one is morally required in that scenario. I defend the intuitive verdict that it is permitted but not required to turn the trolley in the Trolley Scenario. First, I show that the crucial premise of Frowe’s argument – the premise that one has a duty to prevent harm to others when one can do so without violating anyone’s rights, and without bearing an unreasonable cost – is false. And second, I present an independent argument (one originally offered by Frances Kamm) for the permissibility of not turning the trolley in the Trolley Scenario.

Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness

Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness
  • Peter A. Graham
  • Published online:
    20 March 2021
    Print publication:
    15 April 2021
  • There is presently a debate between Subjectivists and Objectivists about moral wrongness. Subjectivism is the view that the moral status of our actions, whether they are morally wrong or not, is grounded in our subjective circumstances – either our beliefs about, or our evidence concerning, the world around us. Objectivism, on the other hand, is the view that the moral status of our actions is grounded in our objective circumstances – all those facts other than those which comprise our subjective circumstances. A third view, Ecumenism, has it that the moral status of our actions is grounded both in our subjective and our objective circumstances. After outlining and evaluating the various arguments both against Subjectivism and against Objectivism, this Element offers a tentative defense of Objectivism about moral wrongness.