Chapter 5 notes that the anarchist argument against private property underdetermines which positive position libertarian property rights theorists ought to endorse. One option is to simply concede that people lack any sort of claim rights when it comes to natural resources ‒ that is, endorse what the chapter calls the Hobbesian conclusion. However, the chapter argues that this proposal must be rejected because it violates the moral tyranny constraint. Instead, the chapter argues that libertarians and property rights theorist should accept what it calls the anarchist conclusion. This thesis holds that persons do possess certain claims against others using unowned resources, where these claims correspond to the prescriptions of a luck egalitarian principle of distributive justice. The chapter then argues that libertarians have limited basis for rejecting the anarchist conclusion, as it is compatible with both their favored property-based theories of justice and the arguments that support such theories.

Chapter 6 observes that the dominant interpretation of luck egalitarianism fails to fully satisfy the moral tyranny constraint. To resolve this problem, it offers an alternative interpretation that both eliminates the possibility of moral tyranny and rescues luck egalitarianism from two other prominent objections that have been raised against the position. Specifically, it argues that agents forfeit a claim to an equal share of advantage when they make sanctionable choices, where an agent makes such a choice when she fails to act in the way that her evidence suggests will maximize the expected (appropriately distributed) advantage that her action would produce under conditions of full compliance. The chapter, first, explicates what this means and, next, argues that the proposed account of sanctionable choice resolves both Richard Arneson’s costly rescues objection and Susan Hurley’s boring problem.