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1 results

  • 9 - How Crooked Is the Timber?

  • from Part II - What Can We Conclude about Our Theories of Corporate Governance?
  • Bryce C. Tingle, University of Calgary
  • Book:
    Hard Lessons in Corporate Governance
    Published online:
    23 May 2024
    Print publication:
    30 May 2024, pp 193-209

  • Summary

    A key component of agency cost theory is that, if left to their own devices, managers will behave in self-interested ways. Natural experiments created by the adoption of constituency statutes, corporate opportunity waivers, tax windfalls, and legal changes to the corporate fiduciary duty show that even when given the freedom to engage in self-interested behavior, managers remain faithful stewards of the firm and remain focused on maximizing profits. Despite agency cost theory’s assumption that managers are self-interested, managers appear to be generally trustworthy. Even if some managers are inclined to behave in strongly self-interested ways, most of them are constrained by competitive markets, which provide little room for slack and diversion. Charlie Brown kicking a football makes an improbable appearance.