Despite increasing awareness and high-level commitments on disability inclusion by humanitarian donors and actors, persons with disabilities continue to be ignored from humanitarian assistance. Rights and inclusion of persons with disabilities are a foreign policy priority for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, including in humanitarian assistance. The primary means for donors, such as Finland, to promote disability-inclusive humanitarian action are funding and advocacy. Trade-offs between flexible and earmarked funding for disability inclusion are challenging when reporting on results is inadequate. This article shares examples on how the Ministry promotes inclusion of persons with disabilities in humanitarian action and explores challenges that need to be resolved by stakeholders.

The lack of a supranational legal authority that can enforce private contracts across borders makes debt repayment in an international setting contingent on borrowers' willingness to pay rather than ability to pay. This market failure (i.e., inadequate enforcement) causes investment to fall short of its unconstrained level. This paper examines how foreign aid affects a country's willingness to honor private investment agreements. We consider two types of aid: technical assistance and loan subsidies. We show that when enforcement is inadequate, aid has the following effects: (i) it reduces default risk, promotes capital flows, and can, in principle, restore investment to its unconstrained level; (ii) when default risk is high, aid can increase the welfare of both the recipient and the donor country. Thus, foreign aid serves as an enforcement mechanism in an international setting. This provides a nonaltruistic rationale for foreign aid. Finally, we discuss the implications of providing bilateral versus multilateral aid (e.g., by individual countries versus multilateral organizations).