In Singapore, residents have expressed concerns about the safety of autonomous vehicles. This chapter considers the case of Singapore, which has supported the development of autonomous vehicles and tested their use. Using research studies and newspaper reports, the chapter examines the rhetorical devices used to frame relevant discussion and identifies the narrative arguments used to reduce fears and justify the presence of vehicles on public streets. The narratives of government and commercial entities complement each other and are frequently upbeat, but they differ in that commercial entities asserted the narrative that autonomous vehicles were inevitable, while government entities did not. The government’s rejection of inevitability supports a different view of law and government, in which government officials decide the degree and pace of AV development. However, Singapore has not adopted a strict regulatory approach, and opted instead for light touch regulation. As a narrative argument, rejection of inevitability does not dictate regulatory approach.

Are robots a tool mindlessly following their programming, or an actor with agency? Are robots inevitable to the extent that we should just accept them, or does regulation have a role to play? And how do we understand our understanding, that is, how do we arrive at concepts to understand human–robot interaction that adequately incorporate different disciplines? These questions suggest that to understand robots and our place in the legal world with them, we must consider subject matter beyond substantive law and procedure. The narrative chapters in this Part of the book provide additional ways to identify the questions raised by human–robot interaction and propose how to begin answering them.

This chapter examines the criteria exposed by Stephen Jay Gould’s original paper on just-so stories to sustain such a charge. I show that Gould’s concerns were neither directed to narrative explanations nor were they ineluctably linked to their narrative quality. Then I analyse how advocates of narrative science have met the challenge. I identify two basic defensive approaches: the vindication of explanatory narratives in cases where the historical, contingent and causally complex nature of the phenomena demand a narrative approach and an unveiling strategy showing how there’s a narrative behind each law-like generalization or nomological explanatory formula. The chapter’s concentration on the argumentative moves of the discussants helps clarify their positions. Moreover, the argumentative quality of their object of study (scientific reason-giving practices) is also emphasized. I claim that the dialectical requirement of openness to collective survey and discussion is what may prevent just-so charges for any kind of explanatory model.