The recent global growth of anti-democratic sentiment has renewed the question of when a political party should be barred from the electoral arena. In modern democracies, even explicitly militant ones, constitutional mechanisms for banning political parties are rarely used. The recent decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) not to ban the National Democratic Party, despite its neo-Nazi platform, is an example of this restraint, with the BVerfG introducing a new, stricter criterion called “potentiality” for the dissolution of a political party under the German Basic Law. This article draws on neo-institutionalism and comparative constitutional law to explore the democratic ramifications of three different European thresholds for banning an anti-democratic political party: the presumptive test previously used by the BVerfG, the new potentiality criterion introduced by the BVerfG, and the European Court of Human Rights’ requirement for the party in question to be an imminent threat before it can be dissolved.

Silvestri interviews McCloskey about her forthcoming book, ‘Beyond Behaviorism, Positivism, and Neo-Institutionalism in Economics’, critical of recent economics, especially of neo-institutionalism. Neo-institutionalism uses the ugly character ‘Herr Max U’ as its central idea: the elevation of Prudence to the only virtue. Institutions are mainly intermediate, not ultimate, causes in society. Ethics, rhetoric, identity, ideology, and ideas matter. McCloskey's turn to defending liberalism is in the background of her critique of behaviorism, positivism, and neo-institutionalism as anti-liberal, reducing the analysis of people to a model of childish slaves. Liberalism is the theory of non-slave adults. Of the big ideas of the past few centuries, only liberalism treats people with suitable dignity, and permits them to have a go, and make others rich. Neo-institutionalism shares the two sins of modern Samuelsonian economics: a devotion of mere existence proofs; and a deviation to arbitrary tests of statistical ‘significance’. And in its tale of a rise of ‘capitalism’, it shares the errors of amateur economic history. The better word for the modern economic world of the Great Enrichment – fully 3,000% increases in real income per person – is ‘innovism’. Neo-institutionalism, as the method of historical economics, must be replaced by ‘Humanomics’.

Every year, over 25,000 people from Mexico and the Caribbean migrate to Canada through the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) to work on a Canadian farm. To what extent does the SAWP, as an institution, impact the vulnerability of migrant agricultural workers? The insights and explanations provided by neo-institutional theory’s three streams help to better account for the complexity of the economic and socio-historical SAWP-generated factors that affect the situation of migrant workers. It is shown that this program has created and continues to perpetuate a context in which it is difficult for migrant workers to have control over their working conditions.

This article looks at the relationship between economic ideas and policymaking in Africa over the last half century. It discusses the ways in which the focus of economists working on Africa has moved from the structuralist-developmentalist and neo-Marxist perspectives of the 1960s and 1970s, through a neoliberal phase of the 1980s and 1990s, to a more eclectic combination of neo-institutionalism, growth orientation, and welfarist interests in poverty and redistribution issues. These shifts in development thinking, while not unique to Africa, have not been the subject of much debate in Africa. The article argues that such a debate is long overdue, including an interrogation not only of the leverage of foreign interests, but also of the profession of economics itself and the implications of its material underpinnings and social construction on the integrity and credibility of its research.

The field of judicial politics had long been neglected by political scientists outside the United States. But the past 20 years have witnessed considerable change. There is now a large body of scholarship on European courts and judges. In addition, judicial politics is on its way to become a sub-field of comparative politics in its own right. Examining the models used in the literature, this article suggests that this geographical convergence is also bringing about theoretical convergence. One manifestation of theoretical convergence is that models of judicial decision-making once deemed inapplicable in Europe are now used in studies of European courts too. But the convergence trend goes further. What we already know about judges and the contexts in which they operate suggests a way of reconciling the various attitudinal and institutionalist approaches used by scholars on both sides of the Atlantic within a general, unifying theory of judicial behaviour. The emerging theory provides a framework to assess the weight and interactions of a wide range of determinants of judicial decision-making across countries and legal systems.