After losing 500,000 soldiers in Russia during 1812, Napoleon quickly rebuilt his army in early 1813 to stop the pursuing Russians in Germany. His strategic situation took an unfavorable turn after Prussia broke its alliance with him and joined the Russians and British to form the Sixth Coalition. With Austria choosing to remain neutral, the Allies hoped to achieve a victory to convince Vienna to join the Coalition. Although the Allies took the offensive against his raw conscripts, Napoleon remained the master of operations. He drove the Allied army over 200 miles eastward in one month, earning important yet indecisive victories at Lützen and Bautzen. With the Allied army pinned against the Oder River in eastern Silesia, Napoleon agreed to an armistice brokered by the Austrians. Both sides used the time to build up massive forces and to woe Austria but Napoleon’s intransigence drove them to join the Coalition. After the armistice expired on 17 August, Napoleon won his only victory in the campaign at Dresden on 27 August. For the first time in the history of the coalition wars, the Allies had a plan of operations that Napoleon could not overcome. For the next six weeks, he chased phantoms, exhausting his troops, and grinding his army into the ground while the Allies defeated his subordinates in Silesia, Bohemia, and Saxony. Finally, tired of running after an elusive enemy, Napoleon allowed himself to be surrounded in the city of Leipzig in the hope of finally waging and winning a decisive battle. The contest started on 16 October and ended with Napoleon commencing the retreat to France with a battered army on 19 October. Germany was lost.

The chapter discusses the events of the War of the Third Coalition that climaxed on the field of Austerlitz in one of the most famous battles in military history. The 1805 Campaign was the first one Napoleon fought as the emperor and it consolidated his martial reputation: a classic example of the general’s logistical and operational brilliance that allowed him to outmarch and outfight his enemy in just three months after the start of the war. Beginning with the bold and rapid advance of the French Army from the Rhine to the Danube, the chapter examines Napoleon’s envelopment of the Austrian army at Ulm, the manoeuvres to Austerlitz and the counter-attack that resulted in the decisive defeat for the Austro-Russian Army.

In 1815 Napoleon made a last desperate attempt to persuade Europe to accept him rather than the Bourbons as ruler of France. When Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia agreed to invade France to remove him he chose the last possible moment to attack the British and Prussians in Belgium, hoping to separate them and capture Brussels without fighting or defeat each in turn. He achieved sufficient surprise to come close to success on 16 June, but his plans required a smoother-running machine than his army provided: poor staff-work, distrust, weary cynicism and some treachery undermined French efforts and the encounters at Quatre Bras and Ligny ended in a draw and a narrow victory. On 17 June Napoleon failed to crush Wellington before the weather intervened to ruin his pursuit. Wellington withdrew his army skilfully to a chosen position where Blücher promised to join him. Napoleon underestimated the dogged determination of his enemies to support each other and the Prussians outmarched Grouchy to arrive in time to transform Wellington’s well-organised, stubborn and brave defence at Waterloo into a crushing victory. After this catastrophic defeat Napoleon had again to abdicate.