While armed conflicts are principally governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), activities of members of non-State armed groups and their affiliates may also qualify as terrorist offences. After explaining why the concurrent application of IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism causes friction, this article analyzes the chief mechanism for dissipating this friction: a clause excluding activities governed by IHL from the scope of criminal law instruments on terrorism. Such armed conflict exclusion clauses exist at the international, regional and national level. This article explains how an exclusion clause can best avoid friction between IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism.

In many conflicts, aid organisations have to navigate the international humanitarian law requirement that parties to the conflict must consent to assistance. In non-international armed conflicts this often frustrates efforts to provide relief, as States refuse to grant consent in order to uphold their claims to sovereignty. Looking at the Syrian Civil War, this article suggests that the law of agency can offer a fresh perspective on the challenges posed by the requirement of consent to humanitarian assistance. It suggests that agency law can provide a legal explanation of seemingly political decisions and a de lege ferenda justification for assistance in instances where consent is either absent or provided by a non-State armed group.