Chapter 10 examines the law of arms control relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its relationship to the jus ad bellum.

This chapter introduces a conception of rule that takes resistance rather than obedience as the constitutive element of rule. Based on an eclectic reading of different theories of rule, we argue that there is no rule without resistance. Even though rule might aim at suppressing resistance or might take such a subtle shape that it hardly encounters resistance, conceptually, rule is bound to resistance. Without a minimum of opposition, a recourse to rule would not be necessary. Even legitimate rule, which Weber calls authority, is legitimate only to a certain degree. As a consequence, not only obedience and the will to comply, but also dissent and the will to resist are part of rule. This chapter therefore sheds light on the relational dimension of rule, by analyzing the dynamic relationship between (forms of) rule and (forms of) resistance at the global level. To this end, we distinguish between two forms of resistance – opposition and dissidence – in order to show how resistance and rule implicate and influence each other. To demonstrate this relationship, we discuss four illustrative case studies on state and non-state forms of resistance and how they indicate and influence different forms of rule.

With the forming of a Grand Coalition, headed by Kurt Kiesinger (CDU/CSU) as chancellor and Willy Brandt (SPD) as foreign minister, West Germany sought equidistance between France and the United States and pursued a new Ostpolitik in parallel with de Gaulle. As Chapter 5 explains, the project proved highly unstable; de Gaulle could do little to aid Bonn vis-à-vis Poland, and Brandt wound up preferring direct contacts with the Soviets. Disputes over Britain’s accession to the EEC further soured Franco-German relations, and Paris was hardly pleased at Bonn’s renewal of its offset promises toward London and Washington. But the U.S.–German relationship also came under strain as the United States and USSR negotiated a non-proliferation treaty (NPT) that would force West Germany to accept a permanently inferior status. Kiesinger and Brandt used their leverage with Washington to force significant changes to the NPT in the areas of nuclear research and commerce; but they also consulted with other nuclear have-nots, such as India and Iran, and contemplated Germany’s future as a middle-sized power. Increasingly, West Germans identified technology exports as a significant source of prestige.

This chapter examines the main features of the centralised approach in general terms before turning to its clearest illustration, the international law of nuclear energy. The examination of the latter follows two main steps. Firstly, the chapter discusses the ‘dual use’ of nuclear technology, for civil and military purposes, as main historical driver for centralisation. Secondly, it analyses the structure and content of the centralised governance of nuclear energy, paying particular attention to the role of the IAEA. The international law of nuclear energy is presented by reference to the legal balance between nuclear cooperation and safeguards, safety standards (prevention, response and reparation) and environmental protection.

Informal modes of cooperation such as transgovernmental networks (TGNs) and informal international governmental organizations (IIGOs) have been proliferating rapidly at the international level. Most efforts to explain the rise of these arrangements as complements to or substitutes for formal international governmental organizations (FIGOs) have focused on the demand side of when states prefer to create and use informal over formal institutions. Here attention shifts to the supply side and how changing transportation and communication technologies have made new forms of cooperative arrangements possible. While these changes have facilitated the rise of both TGNs and IIGOs, the chapter focuses in particular on how they enable the combination of TGNs and IIGOs to work together. The “Hierarchy plus Networks” (HpN) model shows how quicker transportation possibilities for diplomats coupled with the instantaneous exchange of email messages and of attached documents make it much more feasible for state leaders to cooperate directly. Internationally, this allows states to (sometimes) bypass traditional FIGOs; domestically, it enables concentration of power close to executive leadership while (sometimes) bypassing foreign policy ministries in favor of direct international engagement among line departments. The chapter examines the emergence of the Proliferation Security Initiative to illustrate the argument.

For the last six decades, the NPT, as it is commonly known, has been the legal cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The rationale for the treaty, its main provisions, and the challenges it has been meeting over the last 25 years in particular are discussed.

The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) at the United Nations General Assembly and its movement toward ratification raises both hopes amongst some and fears amongst others regarding the development of customary practice under international law. Although the TPNW purports to strive for universality, significant questions remain regarding the Treaty’s aims and achieving legal unity within the international legal order. The purpose of this chapter is to explore these and other issues regarding the TPNW’s prospects of achieving universality under customary international law and opinio juris.