Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the book. Motivating the book with examples of various regulatory barriers to agricultural trade that have proven particularly contentious, this chapter asks what might explain these barriers and whether we should expect current international solutions to resolve them. The chapter provides a brief overview of the book’s argument regarding how producers leverage private information to acquire the sorts of regulatory barriers that the opening examples describe. In addition, it previews the book’s main contribution and gives a brief chapter outline.

The final empirical chapter turns to the international level in order to determine whether delegation to an international standard-setter alters the regulatory dynamics identified. Looking at the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the chapter asks whether this institution has been able to ameliorate the regulatory biases found domestically. In order to answer this, the chapter replicates the analysis conducted on agrochemical regulation in the United States, this time looking at changes to standards under Codex. The chapter shows that even though Codex standard-setters are substantially more removed from the domestic political process than regulators in the USA, the Codex Commission has shown as much of, if not a greater tendency to systematically impose stricter standards on out-of-patent agrochemical products. As such, the international standard-setter has ended up placing more onerous rules on more affordable products for reasons that are less based on science than they are based on the absence of scientific information. In addition to showing that international standards have been vulnerable to similar biases as domestic regulations, this chapter also explores how developing countries and generic producers have sought to combat the regulatory barriers that have arisen at the international level and how innovative firms have successfully blocked them.

This part gives an overview of the core legal disciplines of the SPS and TBT Agreements, the transparency obligations and related practices that have developed, as well as the provisions enabling regulatory dialogue and co-operation. It demonstrates that the legal and institutional disciplines of the SPS and TBT Agreements set the ground for a Member-driven implementation process. Because the substantive obligations remain part of ‘incomplete contracts’ with limited information necessary for their operation, the transparency obligations and related committee practices enable regulatory dialogue as a way for Members to work together towards the most appropriate domestic measures. Ultimately, the robust transparency framework of the Agreements places the Members as guardians of legality of each others’ domestic regulations and allows them to cooperate to ensure effective implementation.