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I focus on an overlooked aspect of the challenge of irrelevant influences. The challenge is often framed in terms of whether recognizing the presence of irrelevant factors in the pedigree of a belief provides a defeater. I argue that the epistemic significance of irrelevant factors goes beyond their status as defeaters. I focus on what I call gray cases, where learning about such factors causes epistemic worry without justifying giving up the belief. I argue that in gray cases, the subject finds a commendatory epistemic practical reason to engage in an activity intended to assuage that epistemic worry.

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On the Practical Significance of Irrelevant Factors

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On the Practical Significance of Irrelevant Factors