This chapter explores the questions of what is a ‘family’ in EU law and whether EU policies sufficiently address family diversity and its consequences. The chapter departs from the premise that the prevalence of the nuclear family model has traditionally meant that the only valid form of family in EU law was one consisting of an adult man and an adult woman who live together in a single-state context and produce their own biological children. This model is, also, based on the sexual division of labour: the man is the main breadwinner, whilst the woman is the homemaker. Nonetheless, in recent years there is growing evidence of diversity in family forms. Moreover, there is an increasing departure from the traditional sexual division of labour. Although many EU Member States are already acknowledging this changing landscape of family life in their law and policy, the important question is whether the EU has been influenced by this: does EU law now sufficiently address family diversity and its consequences? In this chapter, this main question is analysed by examining the concept of ‘family’ employed across a spectrum of fields of substantive EU law.

This chapter analyzes the debates over inclusion of parents in the survivor benefit program under the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act and the design and implementation of dependency standards for parents. Definitions and measures of dependency varied between different eligible groups. Qualifying for benefits proved difficult for aged Americans under administrative practices which privileged dependency centered on the nuclear family model. These benefits mirrored the occupational exclusions found in Old Age and Survivors Insurance, thus limiting access based on race, gender, and citizenship. Survivor benefits for parents are in a middle ground between means-tested and contributory systems in the spectrum of American social policy. While initially facing a means test, parent recipients were then presumed to be dependent for their lifetime, thus avoiding the continued investigations in OAA. Once dependency was established, the program’s administration placed recipients in the contributory track of social policy.

This chapter intervenes in ongoing queer ecocritical debates about reproductive futurity by turning to Henry David Thoreau’s engagement with nurse insects and trees. It demonstrates how Thoreau dislocates biological reproduction in both space and time, urging us to attend to a broader range of participants – and a broader range of contributing actions – in our account of the reproductive process. Arguing that such a complex, multispecies understanding of reproduction distinguishes Thoreau from both contemporary environmentalists, whose rhetoric often relies on normative logics of reproductivity, and queer theorists, who often critique such logics, the chapter theorizes an environmental ethic informed by the extant queerness of reproduction itself. In contrast to the contemporary activist organization “Conceivable Future,” which helps women decide whether to have children in a time of climate catastrophe, such a reading of Thoreau offers possibilities for solidarity and social change that customary definitions of reproduction have rendered inconceivable.

The Introduction outlines revolutionary leadership’s liberal view – pervasive at the time but little recognized by scholars to date – that all Cubans should be absorbed into a nuclear family, for their own good and to advance the goals of the Revolution. In order to telegraph this redefinition of morality – and its consolidation around the nuclear family – leadership and the state media sought to mobilize and modify the meaning of words related to family and identity. Using feminist gender analysis, discourse analysis, and the Gramscian concept of hegemony, the Introduction highlights how ordinary Cubans responded by constructing alternatives to the narrative espoused by the state. This analysis of how power was consolidated throughout the first decade traces two intersecting developments: the state’s steady progression from a democratic to authoritarian movement and its increasing attempts to monopolize morality, albeit with some resistance from ordinary Cubans that has heretofore been obscured from the grand narrative of Revolution. Indeed, a focus on the inconvenient truths of the government’s own past reveals how utterly the Revolution failed to impose a normative definition of morality and how reluctant citizens were to comply with state models of morality.