In many, if not most cases, the ECtHR relies on its own precedents in interpreting the Convention, but some cases may present the Court with new and difficult questions of interpretation. To answer these, the Court relies on a number of specific principles and methods of interpretation. The Court is guided in its work by several core principles, such as effectiveness, evolutive interpretation and autonomous interpretatio, but these are still relatively abstract in nature and they may not suffice to answer a concrete question of interpretation. For that reason, the Court often also relies on the methods of interpretation as described in the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such as textual interpretation, interpretation in light of the travaux préparatoires and internally harmonising interpretation. This chapter discusses the Court’s use of these three methods. In addition to these methods, the Court has opted for a particular refinement of one of the Vienna Convention’s methods, which is consensus or common ground interpretation. This method and the various sources for the Court’s finding of a consensus are also discussed in this chapter.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties remains the yardstick for the interpretation of treaties. International tribunals generally base their decisions on Convention rules, although, as different areas of law with their own dispute settlement systems have developed, there are also particular approaches. The Convention rules are contained in Articles 31--33, and the chapter focuses on these. Each element of the general rule of interpretation in Article 31 and the supplementary means of interpretation in Article 32 is analysed, including the role of subsequent agreement or subsequent practice. Further sections summarise other supplementary means of interpretation and look at treaties in more than one language.

[15.1] An earlier chapter (chapter 6) established the importance of the text in statutory interpretation. The present chapter examines how particular presumptive meanings may be derived from the particular words in doubt. The primary meanings are the ‘literal’, ‘grammatical’, ‘natural’ and ‘ordinary’ meanings. Often combined, the presumptive meaning that reading a provision generates may be described, for instance, as the ‘ordinary and grammatical meaning’ and the ‘natural and ordinary meaning’.

[32.1] The task of an interpreter is to determine the intention of Parliament ‘assisted by such aids to construction as can properly be utilised’.1 This chapter considers residual common law presumptions and aids that are potentially available.

We turn now to the important question of what constitutes a ‘quotation’. Clearly, the breadth of the concept of ‘quotation’ will affect the scope of any quotation exception and so it is vital to identify what can be characterised as quotation. Our central argument in this chapter is that the concept of ‘quotation’ in Article 10(1) is far wider than the ‘typical’ case of textual quotation and that the attributes of ‘typical’ quotation must not be elevated to conditions for the availability of the exception.