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Partisans have biased perceptions of objective conditions. At first glance, the COVID-19 pandemic would appear to be an example of this phenomenon. Noting that most citizens have consistently agreed about the pandemic, I argue that we have overlooked pre-political factors that are as influential as partisanship in shaping citizens’ responses to the pandemic. I identify one such construct in perceived vulnerability to infectious disease (PVD). In one cross-sectional study and one panel study, I find that the influence of PVD on citizens’ perceptions of COVID-19 equals that of partisanship. I also find that PVD can moderate the influence of partisanship on perceptions of harmfulness, nearly erasing the impact of being a Republican on perceiving COVID-19 as a threat. When led by PVD as well as partisanship to accurately perceive harm, citizens, including Republicans, attribute more responsibility to former president Donald Trump for his failed handling of the crisis.
Political divisions have become a central feature of modern life. Here, we ask whether these divisions affect advice-taking from co- and counter-partisans in a nonpolitical context. In an incentivized task assessing the accuracy of nonpolitical news headlines, we find partisan bias in advice-taking: Democratic participants are less swayed by (accurate) information that comes from Republicans compared to the same information from Democrats (Republican participants display no such bias). We then adjudicate between two possible mechanisms for this biased advice-taking: a preference-based account, where participants are motivated to take less advice from counter-partisans because doing so is unpleasant; versus a belief-based account, where participants sincerely believe co-partisans are more competent at the task (even though this belief is incorrect). To do so, we examine the impact of a substantial increase in the stakes, which should increase accuracy motivations (and thereby reduce the relative impact of partisan motivations). We find that increasing the stakes does not reduce biased advice-taking, hence no evidence to support the bias is driven by preference. Consistent with the belief-based account, we find that Democratic participants (incorrectly) believe their co-partisans are better at the task, and this incorrect belief is much less severe among Republican participants. Further supporting the notion that the stated beliefs are sincere, raising the stakes of the belief elicitation of relative partisan competence does not affect the stated beliefs. Finally, participants—instead of ignoring the feedback—actually substantially update in favor of their counter-partisans given feedback that suggests counter-partisans are competent.
The chapter shows that Brazilians’ attitudes towards Lava Jato became increasingly divided and more negative over time. Attitudes towards the crusade are sensitive to partisan preferences, especially affect for the Workers’ Party. Results thus point to the precarity of optimism and the importance of voters’ priors in assessing prosecutorial zeal. The chapter also relies on an experiment to investigate whether putting crusades at the forefront of narratives of Brazilian corruption elicits optimism, compared to narratives that focus exclusively on corruption. The results show that when voters fixate on the crimes they are more likely to experience negative emotions and more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. However,the crime-oriented narrative also increases respondents’ external efficacy, whereas the investigation-oriented one has the opposite effect. This suggests that the attitudinal impact of Lava Jato is far from being uniformly in line with the optimistic story. Under certain conditions, pessimists might be right in warning that crusaders’ anti-political message does more harm than good to the view that politics is redeemable.
What explains the lack of electoral consequences for corrupt politicians? Building on studies of motivated reasoning and asymmetric partisan bias, this article highlights the importance of partisan differences in how voters interpret corruption convictions and make voting decisions. I contend that in post-authoritarian democracies, supporters of authoritarian legacy parties (ALPs) are less likely to punish corrupt copartisan incumbents compared to supporters of other parties faced with equally corrupt copartisan incumbents. While voters of all kinds appear likely to ignore corruption among copartisan incumbents, supporters of authoritarian legacy parties are particularly likely to do so. Using original datasets from South Korea, this study shows empirical evidence of the lack of corruption voting for ALP partisans across three legislative elections. This article further finds partisan discrepancies and a striking lack of corruption voting among authoritarian legacy partisans.
Democracy requires factual information and an attentive electorate. The electorate are a key part of a functioning democracy, where they choose between candidates, parties, and policies based on their own political beliefs, which are influenced by information. Because the world of politics is complex, human beings are bounded in their capabilities for decision making and must develop strategies to navigate through an overwhelming amount of political information to form beliefs and make decisions. Political belief systems – or “ideologies” – help people organize this complex political world. However, a large portion of the American public do not have a coherent political belief system, and instead rely on cues and elites to make decisions and form attitudes on the issues of the day. This kind of reliance is efficient, but can also lead people to become vulnerable to mis- and disinformation, fake news, conspiracy theories, and extreme polarization, which can have detrimental consequences for democracy.
Rational choice theory explains and evaluates how individuals choose among alternative instruments to achieve their goals and objectives. Although much research on political decision-making highlights psychological biases that appear to interfere with rationality, the contrast between rational choice and the psychology of information processing is often narrowed by individual and contextual conditions that reduce cognitive biases and promote rational decision-making. This argument is developed by analysing research on heuristics (i.e., shortcuts and cues), motivated reasoning, and framing that pose challenges to rational choice. Three themes emerge from this review. First, there is systematic variation across individuals in the extent to which heuristics, biased reasoning, and framing produce unreasonable and suboptimal decisions. Second, there are definable informational and social contexts that provide incentives for people to engage in deliberate and accurate processing of information. Third, normative evaluations of empirical results have been hampered by inconsistent criteria for what constitutes good decision-making.
A voluminous literature documents that citizens' perceptions of democracy are shaped by electoral victories and defeats, but what reasoning do citizens use to evaluate parties as winners or losers? Drawing on research on partisan-motivated reasoning, I propose an own-party bias in winner–loser evaluations according to which voters evaluate the electoral fate of their party more favourably than that of other parties. Data gathered in the aftermath of the Danish parliamentary election in 2015 support this expectation. Citizens are more inclined to interpret the election outcome as successful for their preferred party, regardless of the actual election result. This is more pronounced the stronger their partisan attachment and among the less politically knowledgeable, who also assign less importance to objective indicators of electoral success. The findings have implications for our understanding of electoral winners and losers and of how electoral results shape party support and polarization.
We illuminate the role that political geography plays in determining districting outcomes. We find that the political geographic features of a state population limit the types of maps that districting authorities are able to draw. When Democrats are highly segregated – for example, in populous urban areas – it is easier for Republicans to draw very efficient gerrymanders and difficult for Democrats to draw plans that give Democrats an advantage. When we estimate the relationship between Democratic clustering in cities and Republican bias, we only see a correlation in the maps that were drawn by Republicans. This correlation does not occur in maps drawn by Democrats, or by independent actors such as courts and citizen commissions. In sum, political geography only leads to a Republican advantage when Republicans are drawing the lines. This underscores an obvious truth about redistricting: the maps do not draw themselves. Rather, humans choose the maps that best serve their personal and political interests.
Although scholars have investigated the effects of redistricting for many decades, surprisingly little is known about the causes of redistricting outcomes. We argue that studying state legislative redistricting in 2011 provides a unique opportunity to identify the theoretical determinants of partisan gerrymandering and assess the political, social, and democratic consequences of bias. We also argue that the story of 2011 redistricting is incomplete without a comprehensive investigation of the causes and consequences of redistricting of state legislatures. Ultimately, our findings reveal the interconnectedness of racial and political gerrymandering and suggest that partisan bias has long-term consequences for public policy and democratic health, yet they also show that it is possible to design redistricting institutions to prevent bias.
Although partisan bias – when an authority transfers discretionary public resources to a politically aligned receiver − has been extensively studied, less is known about how this practice is affected by the voting regime − compulsory or voluntary voting. In this article, I study partisan bias in Chile, using administrative data of transfers from the central authority to local governments, highlighting two relevant scope conditions: the electoral cycle, and electoral uncertainty caused by the adoption of voluntary voting. I found strong evidence of partisan bias, especially in election years and in electorally riskier municipalities. This suggests that the uncertainty introduced by this electoral reform induced politicians to allocate a large share of resources to risky municipalities, because such resources would play a more significant role in the electoral outcome. Overall, these results imply that voluntary voting has a large impact on the way that resources are allocated across subnational units.
Partisan and affective polarization should have observable consequences in Canada, such as bias in political information search and processing. This article presents the results of three studies that test for partisan and ideological bias using the Digital Democracy Project's study of the 2019 Canadian election. Study 1 uses a conjoint experiment where respondents choose from pairs of hypothetical news stories where the slant of the source and headline are both randomized. Study 2 tests for partisan-motivated responsiveness to elite cues with a policy vignette that manipulates the presence of party elite cues and a motivational prime. Study 3 requires respondents to solve a randomly assigned numeracy task that is either political or nonpolitical in nature. Results suggest that Canadians (1) select politically congenial information, though not sources of such information, (2) follow elite cues when partisan motivation is primed and (3) evaluate evidence in ways that are biased by their ideological beliefs.
What shapes attitudes towards procedural rules that constrain executive power? This letter argues that procedural values are contextual: A function of who is in power. Supporters of those in power prefer fewer procedural constraints, while opposition supporters prefer greater. This study reports the results of a unique test using data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Respondents were asked, in both pre- and post-election waves, if they thought it should be ‘easier or harder for the president to keep documents secret from the public’. The panel design makes it possible to track individual changes following the shift in political context. The results show evidence of a partisan ‘flip’ in attitudes following the election, with Republicans becoming less likely – and Democrats more likely – to prefer additional constraints on presidential secrecy. However, this partisan ‘flip’ is present only among higher political knowledge respondents.
Partisan bias and hostility have increased substantially over the last few decades in the American electorate, and previous work shows that partisan strength and sorting help drive this trend. Drawing on insights from moral psychology, however, we posit that partisan moral convictions heighten affective polarization beyond the effects of partisanship, increasing partisan animosity and copartisan favoritism. Testing this theory using data from two national samples and novel measures of affective polarization in everyday life, we find that people who tend to moralize politics display more partisan bias, distance and hostility, irrespective of partisan strength. These results shed light on a different moral divide that separates the American public and raise key normative questions about moral conviction and electoral politics.
How do citizens attribute blame in the wake of government failure? Does partisanship bias these attributions? While partisan cues may serve as useful guides when citizens are evaluating public policies, those cues are likely to be less informative and more distortionary when evaluating government performance regarding a crisis. We address these questions by examining blame attributions to government appointees for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We implement an experimental design in a nationally representative survey that builds on previous work in two ways: (1) we manipulate party labels for the same officials in a real-world setting by considering appointees who were nominated at different times by presidents of different parties; and (2) we examine how domain relevance moderates partisan bias. We find that partisan bias in attributions is strongest when officials are domain relevant, a finding that has troubling implications for representative democracy.
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