In this chapter, Alfano argues that the pathos of distance is a distinctively Nietzschean virtue. He shows that Nietzsche is, among other things, highly focused on when and how one should embody the emotions of contempt and disgust. Alfano argues that the pathos of distance is the virtue that governs the expression of these two emotions, which are largely neglected both in the secondary literature on Nietzsche and in contemporary virtue theory. According to Alfano, the pathos of distance enables one to embody fitting contempt not only for other people and institutions, but also for oneself – a process that Nietzsche sometimes calls spernere se ipsum and sperenere se sperni. These are essential attitudes for someone who wants to inquirywell in the domain of moral psychology and recognize flaws in himself.

In this chapter, Alfano explores the Nietzschean virtue of curiosity. Curiosity, in this reading, is a drive to engage in and positively evaluate the process of inquiry, especially challenging inquiry into difficult and problematic questions. If this is right, then curiosity is less about static states (e.g., true belief, settled knowledge) and more about epistemic activity in its own right. Alfano connects his account of Nietzschean curiosity both with a large number of relevant passages from Nietzsche's writings and with contemporary accounts of intellectual virtue and vice. In so doing, he establishes curiosity as an intellectual virtue worthy of the attention of both Nietzsche scholars and contemporary virtue epistemologists.