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1 results

  • Chapter 12 - Referring to localized cognitive operations in parts of dynamically active brains

  • Edited by Athanassios Raftopoulos, University of Cyprus, Peter Machamer, University of Pittsburgh
  • Book:
    Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference
    Published online:
    05 May 2012
    Print publication:
    12 April 2012, pp 262-284

  • Summary

    This chapter focuses on the knowledge of the references of perceptual demonstratives: terms like 'this' and 'that' used to refer to currently perceived objects, such as a tree or a person. It has often been remarked, as a basic problem in theory of meaning, that the only credible accounts of meaning are truth conditional, but that it is hard to understand how the functional organization of a subject could constitute their grasp of the truth conditions of the statements they make and the thoughts they have. Functionalism stops short, with a mere characterization of the transitions from content to content one does engage in. In perception we are confronted with the references of perceptual-demonstrative terms, and to that extent we can be said to perceive the intended model for demonstrative discourse. There is an epistemic role for consciousness, for sensory awareness in particular, in our grasp of meaning.