While the importance of innovation alliance for high-technological firms is well-documented, existing literature provides little guidance on the role of performance feedback in an alliance governance structure choice. Drawing on performance feedback theory, this study sheds light on the association between performance deviating (either above or below) from firms’ social aspirations and the governance structure choice of innovation alliances. Using an unbalanced panel of Chinese biopharmaceutical firms spanning from 2007 to 2020, we find that firms experiencing negative performance feedback prefer a non-equity innovation alliance structure, whereas those with positive performance feedback are more likely to adopt an equity one. The strength of these relationships is contingent on top management team average tenure and educational-level diversity. Our findings both provide theoretical and practical insights into guiding how firms under different states of performance feedback select alliance governance structures.

We propose that while positive performance feedback is positively related to firm sentiment, negative performance feedback is negatively associated with the firm sentiment. Additionally, overconfident Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) will improve the positive relationship between positive performance feedback and firm sentiment and reduce the negative relationship between negative performance feedback and firm sentiment. Using 7,182 firm-year observations for the 2004−2017 period, we show that positive performance feedback positively affects firm sentiment, and negative performance feedback negatively influences firm sentiment. We also found that higher levels of CEO overconfidence will minimize the negative impact of negative performance feedback on firm sentiment. Our research extends the current discourse on organizational impression management (proxied by firm sentiment) and CEO overconfidence research as we provide a nuanced relationship between firm performance feedback and organizational impression management. Our findings have theoretical and practical implications for corporate governance leaders and shareholders.