The Buddhist no-self and no-person revisionary metaphysics aims to produce a better structure that is motivated by the normative goal of eliminating, or at least reducing, suffering. The revised structure, in turn, entails a major reconsideration of our ordinary everyday person-related concerns and practices and interpersonal attitudes, such as moral responsibility, praise and blame, compensation, and social treatment. This essay explores the extent to which we must alter and perhaps discard some of our practical commitments in light of the Buddhist revisionism. I do not argue here that we should change our ordinary practices, concerns, and attitudes, or that the Buddhist metaphysics does succeed in presenting a better structure. Rather, I offer it as an alternative structure that should be considered seriously.

Section 4(1)(a) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 states that it is an offence for any person to hold another person in servitude or slavery. In February 2018, John Miller and Robert McPhee appeared at the High Court in Glasgow, charged on indictment with this offence. In defining both ‘servitude’ and ‘slavery’, the court was obliged, per s 4(2) of the 2015 Act, to have due regard to the understanding of these terms which has evolved out of the jurisprudence of Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). ‘Slavery’, then, was said to denote ‘the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the rights of ownership are exercised’. If, however, the definition of ‘slavery’ necessarily ‘involves rights of ownership’, then it follows that any enactment of law specifically proscribing slavery is nugatory. Indeed, in Miller, the court ultimately held that ‘there was no evidence upon which they could hold that the complainer had been held in a state of slavery’. This paper consequently asks whether or not in passing s 4(1)(a) of the 2015 Act, Parliament criminalised an impossible action.

According to a ‘Straight’ reading of Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1975) ‘The First Person’, she holds a radically non-referring view of ‘I’. Specifically, ‘I’ is analogous to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It’s raining’. I argue that this is not her conclusion. Her substantive view, rather is that if what you mean by ‘reference’ is a certain rich and recherché notion tracing to Frege, then ‘I’ is not a referring term. Her methodological point is that one shouldn’t be ‘bewitched by language’ into thinking that ‘I’, because of its syntax, must exhibit ‘reference’ in this sense.