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The chapter defends a particular philosophical engagement with medicine (i.e., normative philosophy of medicine) that is directly connected to the problem of determining the nature of philosophical inquiry. It starts with the discontinuity view, notably advocated by Pellegrino (1986; 2001), suggesting philosophy and science are discrete. Two primary arguments support the discontinuity view: science is empirical while philosophy is conceptual (Dummett 2010), and science is descriptive while philosophy is normative (Thomasson 2015; 2017). The chapter critically examines and ultimately rejects these claims, introducing the continuity view as an alternative, positing a close relationship between philosophical inquiry and science. Building on the works of Sober (2008), Kaiser (2019), and Kitcher (2011), a normative philosophy of science approach is proposed, distinguishing three levels of analysis (aims, nature, and key concepts), which mirror the types of questions posed by modern medical challenges. The chapter concludes by endorsing philosophy of medicine as a legitimate subdiscipline of philosophy of science, and arguing for the comprehensive value of this approach over conventional perspectives.
Placebo effects raise some fundamental questions concerning the nature of clinical and medical research. This Element begins with an overview of the different roles placebos play, followed by a survey of significant studies and dominant views about placebo mechanisms. It then critically examines the concept of placebo and offers a new definition that avoids the pitfalls of other attempts. The main philosophical lesson is that background medical theories provide the ontology for clinical and medical research. Because these theories often contain incoherent and arbitrary classifications, the concept of placebo inherits the same messiness. The Element concludes by highlighting some impending challenges for placebo studies.
Definitions of health in different branches of medicine are one of the key paradigms in medical sciences. Nowadays, there are two distinct definitions of sexual health and mental health. The definition of sexual health, as well as sexual rights, was proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2006), and the definition of mental health was published in World Psychiatry (Galderisi et al, 2015).
Objectives
The analysis and comparison of these two definitions: mental health and sexual health are two main objectives of this study.
Methods
The analysis was carried out in three areas: logic, philosophical aspects (values) and the impact of other disciplines.
Results
The definition of sexual health reveals a eudaimonistic approach, whereas the definition of mental health is based on a holistic paradigm. Regarding the main principles in the definition of sexual heath, one can identify the following values: well-being, pleasure, safety, sexual rights – compared to harmony, empathy, coping skills, universal values in the definition of mental health. Sexual rights are a constitutive part of sexual health. There is no comparative element in the definition of mental health (e.g. the rights of mentally disabled persons).
Conclusions
These two definitions can have different effects on the prophylaxis and therapy of patients. It all depends on the specific context of care (sexology or psychiatry). Sometimes universal values matter and sometimes not. This is contradictory. Consistency is needed between definitions and practices.
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