Why do states start wars that they ultimately lose? Why do leaders often possess inaccurate expectations of their prospects for victory? The central argument of this book is that institutional variation in how political leaders and bureaucracies relate to one another shapes the propensity for miscalculation at the onset of international conflict. The same institutions that provide the best information also empower the bureaucracy to punish the leader. Thus, miscalculation on the road to war is often the tragic consequence of how leaders resolve the trade-off between good information and political security. This chapter provides an overview of central concepts, briefly summarizes the argument, discusses the contributions of the theory and findings to the field, and details a roadmap of the remainder of the book.

Language use is a skill that requires exposure to language, feedback on usage, and practice. So children need exposure from expert speakers, feedback on the language being acquired, and on any errors children produce, and practice along the way. Languages differ, so the paths children follow within and across languages may vary, and some constructions may be harder to acquire in one language, easier in another. The goal is to learn to use language for communication. Language is essentially social, relying on common ground. Part I (Chapters 2-6) focusses on how adults talk with children; children’s analysis of the speech stream; their first production of words; and how they assign meanings to words. Part II (Chapters 7-11) focusses on children’s acquisition of structure: elaborations of information inside clauses, and combinations of clauses. They also rely on structure when coining new words. Part III (Chapters 12-14) looks at turn-taking, learning to be polite, persuasive, and informative, and how to tell stories. Children who hear two languages have two such systems to learn. Part IV (Chapters 15-16) summarizes evidence for biological specialization for language and considers how continuity and change are reflected in language processing.

Many states, almost invariably among those most ignored in international relations theory, exhibit some inconsistent and initially incoherent behaviour on the world stage. In particular, some of them have appeared to invite international scrutiny of domestic practices on which their governments rely to stabilize domestic affairs and to stay in power, but for which they could be punished, often by the very state or organization whose attention they request. The introduction provides an overview of the book’s argument and its implications for international relations theory and practice, especially when these states are miscoded as strong supporters of the norms they in fact violate as part of their domestic stabilization. When powerful actors make concessions in order to acquire a success case within their global missions of rights promotion, democratization or good governance reforms, they may also contribute to a slow erosion of those same norms.

The introduction provides motivation for our study, describes our approach to studying secrecy, outlines the contribution of our theory, and describes the plan of our book.