‘Law’ and ‘constitution’, like other concepts we use to make sense of the world, have a history.1 In the case of law, part of that history is the ongoing interplay between two different ideas. One is that law concerns what people should, should not and may do. In other words, law is ‘normative’. Another is that law is a product of human activity. Human beings and institutions can and do make and enforce legal norms.

This introduction is focused on two main points. First, it provides an explanation of the continued relevance of the notion of the material constitution in constitutional studies and beyond. It does so by showing the added epistemic value of the notion compared to other conceptions: the political constitutions, the living constitution, the mixed constitution. Second, it gives an overview of the contents of the Handbook by explaining its organisation and its thematic unities.

This chapter examines the interplay between law and politics in the UK Constitution, highlighting that, in many ways, the study of the UK Constitution is a study of politics as much as a study of law. Two alternative readings of the UK Constitution will be introduced. First, we consider the ‘political’ constitution as outlined by J. A. G. Griffith, before moving on to look at the contrasting ideas associated with legal, or common law, constitutionalism. The political constitution emphasises the primacy of the political process as the constitutional means through which government operates and is regulated. The ideas of legal constitutionalism, by contrast, prioritise the need for law to control governmental activity. In turn, each model envisages a particular role for the courts within the constitution. Courts in the ‘political’ constitution play a limited role, secondary to that of elected politicians. By contrast, legal constitutionalism envisages a more active role for the judges in holding elected politicians to account, envisaging the law as articulating the fundamental guiding principles of the constitution.

The modern state of New Zealand was founded on the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between the British Crown and indigenous Maori tribes. New Zealand’s partly uncodified, partly unwritten constitution is thus structured around questions of indigenous rights and the treaty relationship between the Maori and the Crown. This chapter examines how and why the Treaty and indigenous rights play a fundamental role in New Zealand’s constitutional system, and it uses the example of New Zealand to challenge conventional understandings as to what counts as a “constitution.”