This introductory chapter explains the central role of psychology in revolutions, as well as the psychological perspective for understanding revolutions. The central puzzles to be solved include the puzzle of why at a deep level so little changes after revolutions, and why so many revolutions against dictatorships result in new dictatorships coming into being. There are potentially thousands of revolutions that could be the focus of this book, and the selection of the French, Russian, Chinese, Cuban, and Iranian revolutions as the focus of this book is explained. The contents of the book are briefly explained: Two chapters focus on psychological theories relevant to revolutions, three chapters on regime change, and (very importantly) three chapters on what happens in the post-revolution period. It is during this post-revolution period that typically moderates get pushed aside and extremists take over. In the final part of the book, one chapter presents a new psychological model of revolution, and another chapter addresses the question: Does human nature doom revolutions? Finally, in the Afterword, revolutions are interpreted as acts of collective creativity.

This chapter examines the psychological factors that underlie behavioral continuity after revolution leads to regime change. Revolutions change the people in power, but they do not necessarily change the behavior of those who come to power after the revolution. All revolutionaries, irrespective of their particular ideologies, face the challenge of changing the behavior of people in their society – behavior that took shape over many years in the pre-revolution society. All revolutionaries are confronted with the stubborn resilience of how people think and act as it was shaped before the revolution – but how are behavioral changes to be achieved toward the ideal society that revolutionaries envisaged? Mao and some other revolutionaries proposed there should be “perpetual revolution,” because the possibility of backsliding to pre-revolution behaviors is too great. But perpetual revolution also means perpetual uncertainty and instability – and even chaos. Other extremist programs attempted by revolutionaries (to prevent continuity in behavior) are emptying cities (as practiced by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia) and emptying universities (as practiced by Mao in China and Khomeini in Iran).

Almost all psychological research relevant to revolutions focuses on the conditions in which collective action takes place to topple the ruling regime; almost no attention has been given to what happens after revolutions. Psychologists have homed in on relative deprivation, perceived injustice, identity processes, morality, and related factors as important in collection mobilization. But no serious attention has been given to the question of why after regime change almost all revolutionary governments fail to change mass behavior in line with their revolutionary ideals. The concept of political plasticity is applied in this chapter to explain this failure. Change at the macropolitical and macroeconomic levels can come overnight with the signing of a radical new constitution, but change of actual behavior in line with the ideals of the new constitution takes a much longer time, if it is possible at all. An example is the efforts of the Soviet communists to change behavior in line with their economic and political ideals of collective ownership and collective motivation.

Intergral to the neglect of group and intergroup relations in mainstream psychology is the almost complete absence of research on the psychology of revolution. From the perspective of the poor, the psychology of revolution is an important topic because it relates to a possible path for improving the lives of the masses. However, a psychological assessment of revolutions reveals that in most cases they bring about a change in rulers, but not a change in the system of government or end group-based inequalities in society. In many cases, revolutions against a dictatorship result in one dictator being replaced by another, as has happened in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in Russia, China, Iran, the Arab Spring countries and many other cases. The main reason for revolutions not leading to foundational changes in justice and inequality is limitations in political plasticity, how much and how fast political behavior can change. Political plasticity is shaped by hard-wiring both inside and outside individuals, with hard wiring outside individuals often being the most important factor. Political plasticity is very limited in domains such as leader-follower relations. These limitations in political plasticity can be overcome through extensive and in-depth programs of civic education.