Do public policy debates between activists from different ideological camps in a nondemocratic and illiberal system bridge social divisions or deepen them? Focusing on three controversies regarding family law in Jordan, we argue that activist groups rarely talk to each other in public, and when they do, their discourses aim primarily at mobilizing support within their own camps rather than addressing each other's concerns. Through media analysis, discourse analysis, and in-depth field interviews, we find much polarization and few attempts to build bridges, but also limited though very suggestive exceptions. Those exceptions rely less on public and democratic mechanisms and more on entrepreneurial state actors working quietly, talking opportunistically to each side, and emerging as powerful institutional actors. Authoritarian states can provide sites of deliberation, but deliberation seems to lead to principled agreement beyond the platitudinous only when an institutional actor within the state takes the initiative to get involved.

Influences of the Movimento das Forças Armadas, of earlier Portuguese and of foreign constitutions on Portuguese Constitution of 1976 — A semi-presidential system with originally four political powers: president, parliament, government and Revolutionary Council — Progressive ascendancy of the presidency in practice between 1976–1982 — Constitutional amendment of 1982: Revolutionary Council abrogated, parliamentary powers strengthened, presidential powers reduced — Presidential role in practice not declining, though depending on the political party power constellation — Influence of president as political moderator and institutional regulator at the lowest when political colours of president and parliamentary majority match — President not conducting, directly or indirectly, the country’s general policy.