This chapter is devoted to mid-century systems theory, which, I argue, is where the behavioralist solution to the problem of social order found its paradigmatic – and also its theoretically most problematic – expression. Specifically, the chapter considers David Easton’s theory of the political system as the most explicit effort to thematize and theorize the problem of social order that the discipline has seen. The effort ended, I show, in an undecidable vacillation between political authority and societal consent to authority as the ultimate source of social order.

In the aftermath of Democratic Kampuchea and the civil wars that preceded and succeeded it, victims have rebuilt their lives, demonstrating a desire and capacity to survive in the face of extreme hardship. This chapter explores resilience in post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia. Using a social ecological lens, it examines how various systems – and in particular political, legal and economic systems – interact to provide resources that enable and foster resilience among victim populations. It also demonstrates, however, that these systems, individually and in interaction with each other, often remove resources or even undermine resilience. Within this systemic structure, the chapter analyses how transitional justice work in Cambodia has affected resilience. Focused specifically on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, it argues that while the tribunal has the potential to contribute to resilience (and does for some victims), its design and procedures constrain it in this regard, even inadvertently reinforcing broader marginalising systemic dynamics. The key point is that national actors in Cambodia recognise that they can gain significant advantages through corrupt practices and autocratic power, and thus they have used transitional justice strategically to undermine peacebuilding.

Bangladesh was under military rule from 1975 to 1990 when a popular uprising toppled the dictator and restored parliamentary democracy. Since then elections have been held regularly and the political system has been dominated by two parties with charismatic leaders. Despite recurring elections, however, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh is not democratically ruled. The power elite of this society of 170 million people is remarkably small and surprisingly connected by family ties, even across party lines. Each time, a tight-knit coterie of familiar power holders comes out on top.