Chapter 6 addressed the puzzle of why politicians employ violence as an electoral tactic in Kenya when the benefits of doing so are uncertain at best. Data from survey experiments with politicians that parallel those conducted with voters – as well as evidence from qualitative interviews – show that, contrary to what the literature assumes, politicians misperceive the effects of violence and violent ethnic rhetoric on voter preferences over candidates for office, underestimating the size and breadth of voter backlash against the use of these tactics. This misperception explains why election-related violence continues to occur in Kenya despite its questionable efficacy as an electoral tactic. Furthermore, access to information alone does not appear to be enough to correct politicians misperceptions in this domain. Elite misperception can explain why violence occurs in the course of electoral competition even when its efficacy is in doubt.

Central to the history of family planning in Ireland is the interaction between religious observance and expressions of Irishness, and how that changed in response to domestic political and socio-economic developments, and international forces. An Irish identity imagined around rural living, Catholicism, large families, traditional gender roles, and sexual puritanism, combined with a belief that Ireland could withstand the changes that were underway in twentieth-century western society in relation to sexual behaviour – drove the sustained hostility to legalising contraception. The 1980s was the decade when it became evident that the tide had turned. The number of married women in the workforce rose significantly, and fertility fell sharply. By the early 1990s Irish fertility was still the highest in Europe, but only by a small margin, and it was lower than in the United States. And yet the decline of this imagined Irishness was not unopposed; indeed, many lamented its passing. it is significant that the moral legislation enacted in the first decades after independence survived until the closing decades of the twentieth century, which might suggest that Ireland was exceptional.

Are there systematic differences between the behaviour of politicians – such as ministers, members of parliament or elected municipal council members – and that of ‘the rest of us’? Are politicians in a ‘league of their own’ in terms of how they take decisions and make judgements? In the existing literature, there is no overriding consensus or clear majority of findings on these questions. We add to this literature by leveraging results from an experiment with two samples: (1) Dutch locally elected politicians (n = 211) and (2) students (n = 260). The experiment examined whether these two groups displayed biases related to the representativeness heuristic and the availability heuristic – two so-called general purpose heuristics – and whether they displayed the reflection effect. Our findings demonstrate that politicians’ judgements and decisions are largely similar to those of the rest of us, indicating that there is little evidence of an elite-public gap in this respect. Under specific circumstances, however, politicians do differ in their judgement and decision making. These differences may have consequences for the functioning of representative democracy and for policy making. It is especially noteworthy that in this study political experience or expertise did not reduce decision-making biases.

Representative democracy relies on those willing and able to put themselves forward for political office. Equally, elections involve a drastic transfer of democratic power from the many to the few, deciding ‘who’ has that power, but not necessarily ‘what’ is done with it. The latter may well depend on the personal predispositions and desires of those who seek a political career. Existing research suggests that political aspirants are not only a tiny minority of the population, but also distinct in their personality characteristics by comparison to those they govern or seek to govern. Reviewing and building upon this literature, this chapter draws on original data from political elites and members of the UK public to understand how the unique psychologies of politicians might also precipitate and explain differences and similarities between their political opinions and those of citizens. This chapter finds (a) personality predispositions represented as basic values share meaningful relationships with political attitudes, (b) politicians and candidates differ from the public in their basic values, (c) basic values have a stronger effect upon political attitudes among elites than masses, but (d) the explanatory potential of a predisposition model is improved by accounting for partisan conflict and socio-demographic factors.

Democracy is under attack. Whether from those within its systems who seek to gain at the expense of others, or from without by rival forms of rule. Yet the crises we face as a species demand not only that we recognise the perils of a changing planet, but that we address them together. Democracy may imply an imperfect form of government, but its purported advantages lie in seeking to give voice to all people, political parties and perspectives, in hopes that the common good is served and citizens not only represented, but respected. The challenge of a pandemic, finding nations divided in their responses, underlines the pressing need for a genuine understanding of what democracy can and does deliver. This necessitates a clearer focus on our own roles as citizens – and thereby politicians in our daily lives – and on occupational politicians, as well as the political institutions and influences that shape our experiences of democracy. In opening ‘Psychology of Democracy: Of the people, by the people, for the people’, the editor points to the power of harnessing multidisciplinary and cutting-edge knowledge from psychology, political and allied social sciences. The opening chapter maps out the design and potential impact of the book, examining the psychology ‘of the people’ who are elected, the political institutions and processes created ‘by the people’ and the influences from broader societies that shape the context of democracy ‘for the people’. Its message is clear: the future is ours if we can better harness all human talents.

In contrast to accounts of political mobilization that focus solely on patronage and/or co-ethnicity, this chapter argues that – to be successful – candidates need to speak to both the patrimonial and civic registers of virtue. Even aspirants who emphasise their claims to patrimonial virtue must make some claim to civic virtue and/or justify their deviation from that virtue as a necessary expedient forced on them by the nepotism or tribalism of their rivals. This need stems from the fact that both registers hold moral weight amongst the publics that politicians seek to mobilise, and is reinforced by “decampaigning” efforts whereby an aspirant’s rivals seek to attack their viability, capacity and virtue. The chapter shows how, understanding electoral campaigns in this way – i.e. as a struggle by politicians to speak to both the civic and patrimonial registers of virtue – helps to explain why campaigns are so vibrant and ground-intensive; why politicians give handouts, but also invest in projects, support particular policies, and stand up for local interests; why ethnicity can sometimes become so politically salient and divisive; and how violence and electoral malpractice can sometimes appear as justified (at least to certain audiences). Finally, the chapter underscores how politicians help to shape campaign environments through, for example, the divisions that they foster or salve, the institutions that they build or undermine, and the experiences that they imprint, but how their campaign strategies are also shaped by the political landscapes that they face – with socio-economic contexts, the structure of key political organisations, past experiences, and actions of others helping to ensure that certain messages resonate in some contexts but not in others.

Chapter 3 examines the bubble that occurred in the UK in 1824 and 1825. This bubble concerned the promotion of Latin American mining companies and various new companies on the London stock market. The price of mining shares quintupled and those of other new companies more than doubled between August 1824 and February 1825. Over the next year, the prices of these stocks plummeted. This was then followed by one of the most serious banking crises ever to hit the UK. The chapter then moves on to discuss how all three sides of the bubble triangle were in play. Marketability had been revived by the liberalising attitudes of MPs in the UK Parliament. Part-paid shares leveraged the buying of shares and, allied to low denominations and low returns on other assets, stimulated speculation. The spark which set the bubble fire alight was a change in government policy towards Latin America and the corporation. The chapter concludes by examining the consequences of the bubble. The post-bubble banking crisis which started in December 1825 resulted in the collapse of many banks and was followed by a very deep recession.