This chapter examines the dynamics of meandering rivers, including the initiation of meandering in straight channels; the development of bar units; and the relation of these units to pools, riffles, and point bars. It reviews theories of pool-riffle development and maintenance; flow through meander bends, including the influence of channel curvature and the point bar on flow structure; and the relation of the spatial pattern of shear stress in curved channels to patterns of erosion and deposition, to the development of bar unit topography, and to patterns of bank erosion. Mechanisms of bank erosion are introduced, emphasizing that bank erosion occurs in different types of rivers. Modes of planform deformation on meandering rivers are explored, as well as the factors that influence planform migration dynamics in meandering rivers. The discussion includes a basic introduction to numerical models of meandering rivers and attempts to integrate models of flow and sediment transport in curved channels with models capable of simulating bank erosion and lateral migration of meandering rivers. The chapter also briefly discusses meandering of mixed bedrock-alluvial rivers.

Insurance has two basic theoretical motivations. First, for those parties holding a risky asset to purchase a commodity that reduces the overall expected risk of the two assets, being the original asset and the asset of the insurance policy. Insurance policies are available in various forms on the market, but two of the main types of policies for environmental accidents are first-party (damage to self and own assets) and third-party (damage to other parties and their assets) liability insurance. Moral hazard contains the idea that if you assume the risk for someone else, then they no longer face the costs of those risks and thus are more likely to undertake those risks. Market capacity to supply the necessary volume of insurance policies and to be able to pay them out when needed can be reinforced with several tools, including forms of co-insurance, reinsurance, and pooling. Again, it bears repeating that while some injuries, like a wrecked car, might be remedied by cash payouts, this is not often the case for material environmental injuries. Thus, the creation of moral hazard for environmental insurance policies, both first-party and third-party, is a serious concern.