This chapter lays the foundation for the study of the role of elections in non-democratic regimes. Using VDem data, the analysis in the chapter shows that while stability is the most common response to electoral autocracies, elections can produce change in a liberalizing or autocratizing direction. This introductory chapter describes this process of voter mobilization in Russia in 2011–2012 and in terms of the existing literature on autocratic stability. It creates the foundational framework for the empirical study that brings together important studies of autocratic elections, hybrid regime stability, and post-election protest. This foundation supports the central argument of the book: when controlled elections reveal information about the lack of regime accountability, voters protest at the ballot box and on the streets. Societal mobilization provides opportunities for opposition growth and forces regimes to respond to maintain stability. The final section of the chapter outlines the plan of the book and summarizes the arguments in each chapter.

Chapter 3 begins with a cross-national statistical test of the implication of the formal model. Designed to show the external validity of the model, the analysis explores the effect of different opposition and regime strategies on the likelihood of post-election protest. To illustrate that the information value of these signals varies according to the nature of the information environment, I analyze the outcomes in two types of non-democracy electoral regimes: electoral autocracies and closed autocracies. The results show that regime and opposition strategies do influence the potential for protest and that these effects vary according to the context in which elections are held. Given this finding, the second half of the book focuses on regime efforts to change that environment in the inter-election period, highlighting the propensity to manipulate the factors that alter popular perceptions about the regime its opposition, and the nature of state–society relations.

The formal model presented in the chapter underscores that control over ballot access conveys a significant power advantage to autocratic incumbents. This control leaves electoral oppositions with few options. Yet, even with this power asymmetry, the model demonstrates that elections force autocrats to make strategic choices that reveal information about regime strengths and weaknesses. Banning strong opponents signals regime weakness. Committing fraud to secure victories signals that elections are not mechanisms of accountability. When opposition parties amplify this information, they can generate focal points to foster societal coordination, forcing the regime to respond with concessions or retribution. Depending on the size and structure of the mobilization, these changes can be sudden or incremental, generating uncertainty that has to be addressed in the inter-election period. Through this process, tightly controlled elections contested by weakly organized opposition parties can prompt regime shifts in a liberalizing or autocratic direction. The first part of the chapter presents the model discursively, and the second part formalizes the argument.